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This study goes back ultimately to a response I gave on two pa­
pers presented on “Translating Aristotle’s Politics in Medieval 
and Renaissance Europe” at the “International Conference on 
Translation. The History of Political Thought,” at CUNY in 
2005. Immersing myself in the more recent scholarly literature 
on Humanist translations of Greek philosophical texts I learned 
that one voice was all but absent—the voice of classicists whose 
scholarly focus is the Greek texts that were translated from the 
13th century onwards. Such a voice needs to be heard especially 
for an assessment of the style of the Greek originals and for the 
ancient tradition behind the emerging political terminology in 
the 14th century, e.g. the changing meaning of res publica. For 
both issues an informed reference to classical texts will at times 
lead to different results than those drawn by Medievalists. This 
study examines the earliest Latin translations of Aristotle’s Poli­
tics from the angle of a classicist.
I presented arguments of this study at the Humboldt Uni­
versity Berlin, University of Cologne, University of Colorado at 
Boulder, Universidad Carlos Terzero Madrid, and the Ludwig 
Maximilian University of Munich. I am grateful for the critical 
comments I received. My former student Dr. S. Farrington and my 
daughter Caroline Schütrumpf checked the English of this text; 
any remaining flaws are my responsibility. I would like to thank 
the directors of the Morphomata Center for Advanced Studies 
at the University of Cologne, Professors Dr. G. Blamberger and 
Dr. D. Boschung, for accepting this study for the MLC series and 
Dr. Sidonie Kellerer for thorough copy editing.

1 . t H e  e a r l i e s t  l at i n  t r a n s l at i o n s  o f  a r i s tot l e — 
W i l l i a m  o f  m o e r b e k e
Cicero introduced considerable parts of Greek philosophy in 
Rome in a systematic fashion. He did so by choosing the literary 
form of the dialogue in which he presented selected philosophi­
cal topics from the viewpoint of different philosophical schools 
to a Roman audience. The alternative, that of producing Latin 
translations of Greek philosophical works, he chose to a much 
lesser degree, and due to the loss of the texts in question we 
are not well informed about this option. He translated Plato’s 
Protagoras, likely the entire dialogue, and, as part of an intended 
dialogue on natural philosophy, sections from Plato’s Timaeus. In 
De Finibus I, he writes hypothetically about translating Plato and 
Aristotle,1 but acknowledges that he has not done so yet, how­
ever, he does not believe that it is forbidden to him. He wants to 
limit himself to a translation of “certain passages” (locos quidem 
quosdam). On rare occasions, we find translations of brief Pla­
tonic passages in Cicero’s philosophical writings, like that from 
the Phaedrus (245c5–246a2) in the Somnium Scipionis in De Repu­
blica VI 27–28. It is indicative of Cicero’s approach to translation 
that he did not reveal that the section De Republica VI is actually 
his translation of Plato’s text.2 Cicero intended De Republica as 
a counterpart to Plato’s Politeia3 and the dream of Scipio in the 
final section of Cicero’s De Republica VI was inspired by a myth 
which is found at the end of the last book of Plato’s Politeia. 
 1 De Finibus I 3.7, cited below n. 113.
 2 In other cases, namely translations of only a few lines, Cicero identified 
the Platonic dialogue from which the passage was taken, so the Gorgias 
and Menexenos at Tusculanae Disputationes V 12.34–36.
 3 De Legibus I 5.15.
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Instead of outlining at the end of this work the Platonic concept 
of the ultimate principle of motion, Cicero allows Plato to end 
the treatise by speaking in his own words, only translated by the 
Roman author of the dialogue. 
On the other hand, we do not find in Cicero’s philosophi­
cal writings comparable translations of works of Aristotle. Could 
Cicero have composed such a translation? There has been for 
quite some time an intense scholarly debate about Cicero’s 
knowledge of Aristotle’s work.4 Paul Moraux has argued that 
Cicero had access only to the exoteric works of Aristotle, that it is 
his dialogues, but not the treatises which we now possess as the 
Corpus Aristotelicum. Specifically, he argues that there is no indi­
cation whatsoever that Cicero had read either the Nicomachean 
Ethics or the Politics. Moraux draws attention to the fact that with 
regard to Aristotle’s ethical and political writings, it is the dia­
logues of Aristotle, either On Justice or The Statesman (Politikos), 
Cicero refers to, and not the Politics.5 This means Cicero could not 
have chosen a passage from Aristotle’s Politics in order to adorn 
one of his philosophical works for the simple reason that this 
work was not known to him. Moraux refers to Cicero’s letter to 
his brother Quintus (Ad Quintum fratrem 3.5.1 from Oct./Nov. 54). 
There, Cicero writes that, after a reading of a draft of his work on 
the best state and the best citizen, Sallustius had pointed out that 
these issues could be discussed with much more authority if he, 
Cicero, spoke about the state, especially in view of his experience 
as consul and involvement in state affairs of utmost importance. 
Sallustius refers then to Aristotle, who presented himself as a 
speaker in his dialogues to express his views about the state and 
the leading man.6 Moraux infers from this remark that Cicero 
only knew Aristotle’s dialogues. One might object to this line of 
argument, noting that when Cicero was discussing the role he 
would play in a dialogue and considering Sallustius’ suggestion to 
 4 Cf. the overview in Moraux 1975, 81 n. 1.
 5 Moraux 1975, 94: “Cicéron ne connaît, comme ouvrages politiques 
d’Aristote, que des ouvrages dialogués; il ne semble pas soupçonner l’ 
existence de la Politique que nous lisons encore.”
 6 Aristotelem denique, quae de re publica et praestanti viro scribat, ipsum loqui.
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use his own authority in order to add weight to the arguments as 
Aristotle had done in his dialogues, any reference to a theoretical 
work of Aristotle was out of question.7 
Already in his youth Cicero was engaged in translations, e.g. 
the rendering of the Aratea. Thus it is not surprising that one 
often finds reflections on translating in his work. In Academica I 
he explains the appeal of Ennius, Pacuvius and others by the fact 
that they did not reproduce the words, but expressed the ‘force’ 
or ‘meaning’ of the Greek poets.8 When dealing with translations 
of prose texts he is more specific in explaining an alternative to 
the translation merely of ‘words’. Cicero had planned to translate 
a speech of Aeschines and Demosthenes. In De optimo genere ora­
torum he remarks briefly on the principles he would follow in his 
translation. He would not do so as an interpres, but as an orator 
who does not render verbum pro verbo, but keeps the ideas and the 
form in which they were expressed while bringing the words into 
agreement with the convention of the Latin language.9 The ideal 
which Cicero was to follow stresses accuracy and faithfulness, 
however, not to the individual words but to the sense and its for­
mal expression (sententiis isdem et earum formis). Interpres is almost 
used in a disparaging sense of someone who pays rather pedantic 
attention to individual words which is contrasted with the grasp 
of the whole character of the words and their meaning (genus omne 
verborum vimque). He addresses a different aspect of the literal 
translation when he calls interpretes indiserti, “translators without 
 7 I believe that there are some echoes of Aristotelian phrases in Cicero 
which could be understood as to suggest that Cicero had read Aristot­
le’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. I cannot present the arguments 
here.
 8 Academica I 3.10 qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum expresserunt poetarum.
 9 De optimo genere oratorum 5.14 nec converti ut interpres, sed ut orator, 
sententiis isdem et earum formis tamquam figuris, verbis ad nostram con­
suetudinem aptis. In quibus non verbum pro verbo necesse habui reddere, sed 
genus omne verborum vimque servavi. The argument that words chosen 
should agree with the convention of the Latin language is repeated 
later at 7.23 when Cicero states that as translator he follows Greek 
words only so far as it does not conflict with Latin custom (verba 
persequens eatenus, ut ea non abhorreant a more nostro).
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eloquence.”10 The literal translation is also rejected by Horace.11 
Another aspect Cicero had to address is philosophical terminol­
ogy and in particular the question whether one should try to find 
Latin equivalents or introduce the Greek terms in translitera­
tions or coin new terms in Latin.12 We will return to this in the 
context of the Latin translations of Aristotle’s Politics. 
Marius Victorinus (b. before 300 A.D.) was the first to make 
available the Aristotelian writings on logic through translations 
into Latin. He translated the Categories and On Interpretation13—
both translations are lost. Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (c. 
480–525) set out an ambitious plan to translate all of Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s works into Latin.14 He did not live to carry it out but 
completed a number of translations (probably before 510 A.D.), 
including Aristotle’s Categories ,15 On Interpretation ,16 Prior Analytics ,17 
Topics ,18 and the Sophistical Refutations.19 He expressed in theoretical 
terms the principles a translator should adhere to when translating 
texts in which rerum cognitio is sought, s. below p. 24.
 10 De Finibus III 4.15. In a similar vein Jerome argues that in a literal 
translation of Homer into Latin one will find the word order ridic­
ulous and Homer, the most eloquent poet, hardly speaking (uidebit 
ordinem ridiculum et poetam eloquentissimum uix loquentem), ep. 57.5.8.
 11 Hor. De Arte Poetica 133 f. nec verbum verbo curabis reddere fidus / interpres 
nec desilies imitator in artum.
 12 Cf. Fögen 2000, on Cic. p. 77–141.
 13 Marti 1990, p. 25.
 14 Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis ΠEPI 
EPMHNEIAΣ, Pars Posterior, secundam editionem continens, ed. C. 
Meiser, Leipzig 1880, p. 79: mihi autem … haec fixa sententia est, ut … ego 
omne Aristotelis opus, quodcumque in manus venerit, in Romanum stilum 
vertens eorum omnium commenta Latina oratione perscribam, ut si quid ex 
logicae artis subtilitate, ex moralis gravitate peritiae, ex naturalis acumine veri­
tatis ab Aristotele conscriptum sit, id omne ordinatum transferam atque etiam 
quodam lumine commentationis inlustrem, cf. Dod, CHLMPh 1982, p. 53–4.
 15 L. Minio­Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus I 1, Bruges – Paris 1961. In this vol­
ume the translation of this Aristotelian work by William of Moerbeke 
can be found as well. 
 16 Id. Aristoteles Latinus II 1, Bruges – Paris 1965. 
 17 Id. Aristoteles Latinus III 1, Bruges – Paris 1962.
 18 L. Minio­Paluello – B.G. Dod, Aristoteles Latinus V 1, Bruxelles – Paris 1969.
 19 B.G. Dod, Aristoteles Latinus VI 1, Leiden – Bruxelles 1975.
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It took more than half a millennium until the initiative of trans­
lating Greek originals of Aristotelian works into Latin got a fresh 
start. James of Venice (Jacobus Veneticus Grecus, first half of the 
12th cent.), who produced an important translation of the Posterior 
Analytics , has been regarded as the first systematic translator 
of Aristotle after Boethius.20 Bartolomeo da Messina translated 
Aristotle’s Magna Moralia by the middle of the 13th cent.21 Rob­
ert Grosseteste’s († 1253) translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics (1245–1247), which was used by Albertus Magnus, was ac­
companied by Latin translations of Greek commentaries on this 
work.22 Leonardo Bruni (1369–1444) rejected this translation, and 
its poor quality, as he felt, made him not only justify the need for 
his own translation but write a treatise, De Interpretatione recta , in 
which he identified and criticized the shortcomings of the ear­
lier translation and outlined the requirements a translation into 
Latin must meet (s. below p. 28 ff.). 
A number of these Aristotelian works that were translated 
from Greek into Latin for the first time had already been avail­
able in Latin as translations from Arabic,23 with a few nota­
ble exceptions, among them Aristotle’s Politics.24 In 1255 at the 
 20 Berschin 1980, p. 258; Dod, CHLMPh 1982, p. 46–7; 54–5. 
 21 Berschin 1980, p. 293; Dod, CHLMPh 1982, p. 49; 62.
 22 Berschin 1980, p. 294 f. Cf. H. P. F. Mercken, The Greek commentaries 
on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin translation of Robert 
Grosseteste , Bishop of Lincoln († 1253), in: Corpus Latinum commentario­
rum in Aristotelem Graecorum, 3 vols., Leuven 1973–1991; Dod, CHLMPh 
1982, p. 61.
 23 By Gerhard of Cremona in the middle of the 12th cent. or by Michael 
Scotus by 1220, s. Dod, CHLMPh 1982, p. 47–50; 58–9.
 24 R. Newald, Nachleben des Antiken Geistes im Abendland bis zum Beginn 
des Humanismus , Tübingen 1960, p. 225: Almost the complete work 
of Aristotle was available to Averroës, except for the Politics. This 
reflected the knowledge the Arabic tradition had of Aristotle’s writ­
ings, cf. Flüeler 1992, vol. 1, p. 10; Rémi Brague, “Note sur la traduc­
tion arabe de la Politique d’Aristote, derechef, qu’elle n’existe pas,” in: 
P. Aubenque – A. Tordesillas Aristote Politique. Etudes sur la Politique 
d’Aristote , 1993, 423–33; V. Syros, “A Note on the Transmission of Aris­
totle’s Political Ideas in Medieval Persian and Early­Modern India. 
Was there any Arabic or Persian Translation of the Politics?”, Bulletin 
de philosophie médiévale 50 (2008), 303–09. 
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University of Paris in the faculty of artists, almost the complete 
works of Aristotle were part of the curriculum but his Politics are 
not mentioned.25 The Flemish Dominican William of Moerbeke 
(c. 1215–1286), archbishop of Corinth in Greece in 1278, left be­
hind a monumental record of translations that included not only 
works of Aristotle but those of his commentators as well, and of 
Archimedes, Ptolemy, Galen and of the Neo­Platonist Proclus. 
Some of these works were translated by William into Latin for 
the first time, among them Aristotle’s Politics.26
Two versions of William’s translation of the Politics exist. 
The Translatio prior or imperfecta , dating to the period between 
1255 and 1261,27 which is incomplete (it ends at II 11 1273a30) since 
this is all William’s manuscript contained,28 and the Translatio in­
tegra or completa, the complete translation of the Greek text of the 
Politics as we have it.29 Gérard Verbeke30 has undertaken a detailed 
comparison of a number of passages of the two translations and 
concluded that the second version is remarkably superior over 
 25 S. Flüeler 1992, vol. 1, p. 1 f.; 23. There are a few references to Aristotle 
Politics between the 2nd and 5th cent. A.D., and only in the 11th cent., 
starting with Michael of Ephesus, knowledge of Politics resurfaces, s. 
A. Dreizehnter, Aristoteles’ Politik. Eingeleitet, kritisch herausgegeben 
und mit Indices versehen, Studia et Testimonia antiqua 7 1970, p. XVI­
II–XX; 227. 
 26 Dod, CHLMPh 1982, p. 62–68; ibid. p. 63: he was the first to translate 
De motu animalium, De progressu animalium; Politics, Poetics. Cf. now 
Vanhamel 1989, p. 301–383, in particular p. 319 ff.: “§ 3. Liste annotée 
des œuvres de Moerbeke et aperçue bibliographique” (p. 339–341 on 
the translation of the Politics). 
 27 Flüeler 1992, vol. 1, p. 23; 28.
 28 Cf. Michaud­Quantin, Aristoteles Latinus , XXIX i, 1961, p. IX–X.
 29 I cite from the edition by F. Susemihl 1872. The edition by L.­J. Batail­
lon–H.­F. Dondaine 1971 as part of the edition of the commentary on 
Arist. Politics by St. Thomas, contains William’s translation only to III 
8 1280a5.—F. Bossier, “Méthode de traduction et problèmes de chro­
nologie,” in Brams – Vanhamel 1989 (p. 259–294), p. 292, argues on 
the basis of William’s use of certain conjunctions and adverbs, that 
this version was completed before the middle of the year 1265; cf. as 
well Brams 1989, p. 329–335: “Problèmes de chronologie;” Flüeler 1992, 
vol. 1, p. 23–29: before 1267/8. 
 30 Verbeke 1989, p. 1–21.
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the first one. First of all, William had access to a better Greek text 
when he undertook the second translation, and his ability to de­
cipher and read the Greek manuscript may have improved when 
he was working on the second version. Verbeke observed more 
significant improvements. In the first version, numerous Greek 
words were simply transliterated31—obviously because William 
did not yet know their exact meaning whereas in the second ver­
sion many of them have been replaced by Latin words. On the 
whole, Verbeke recognizes William’s effort to make the transla­
tion easier to understand, which reveals William’s attention not 
just to the meaning of individual words but as well to the mean­
ing of phrases in their context, that is to the content of the text, 
indicating a better understanding of the work he translated. 
While it is correct to conclude on the basis of a comparison 
of the two versions of William’s translation that the improve­
ments in the second version are considerable,32 still the quality 
of the Latin is lacking by the standards of classical Latin prose 
literature (which will be applied by Bruni). William follows the 
Greek text verbum e verbo 33 and it has been said: “the Latin is 
clumsy and sometimes unclear”,34 and the translation is “literal 
to a fault.”35 The intended meaning of William’s translation may 
be better understood if the reader tries to figure out which words 
and sentence structure the Greek text had. One might even fail 
with this. “To grasp fully his meaning one must often refer to the 
Greek text to which, of course, his readers had no access.”36 
William’s close adherence to the Greek original has been 
used by editors of Aristotle’s works to emend the Greek text 
 31 Cf. Michaud­Quantin, Aristoteles Latinus , XXIX i, p. XII.
 32 “les ameliorations sont considérables”, Verbeke 1989, p. 10.
 33 In the Liber de memorabilibus sive Chronicon Henrici de Hervordia (of 
1355), ed. A. Potthast, Göttingen 1859, 203, one finds already the re­
mark about Wilhelm: frater Wilhelmus Brabantinus, Corinthiensis … 
transtulit omnes libros Aristotelis naturalis et moralis philosophiae et meta­
physicae de graeco in latinum, verbum e verbo (cited by Grabmann 1946, 
p. 65 f.), cf. Steele 1989, p. 58.
 34 Schmitt 1983, p. 155 n. 21.
 35 Menut 1970, p. 24.
 36 Schmitt 1983, p. 155 n. 21.
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transmitted in the manuscripts37 which were copied later than 
the date of William’s translation. However, it is not advisable 
to assume that there is something wrong with the transmitted 
Greek text whenever there is a discrepancy with William’s trans­
lation. Aristotle begins his Politics by identifying the genus to 
which the polis belongs, namely a community, and argues that 
the community that strives after the highest good is the polis, the 
political community. The Greek text uses both in lines a1–2 and 
a7 the same noun koinōnia (κοινωνία) for community,38 whereas 
William changes from communitas a1 to communicatio a7.39 There 
is no reason to assume that Aristotle used different nouns here.
Verbeke pointed to the tendency to replace transliterated words 
used in the first version with Latin words in the second one as one 
aspect of progress in William’s translation. However, many Greek 
 37 Cf. Susemihl 1872, p. VI: “Γ, i.e. liber deperditus …, ex quo originem 
deduxit vetusta translatio Latina, quam saeculo XIII0 fecit frater 
Guilelmus de Moerbeka … tam fideliter et accurate verbum e verbo 
reddens, ut raro quid in codice suo legerit dubitare queas.” In the 
Iuntina edition of St. Thomas’ commentary of Arist. Politics , Venice 
1568, the translation of Wilhelm of Moerbeke was replaced by that of 
L. Bruni, however the editor, Iulius Martianus Rota, adds as an appen­
dix antiquam Politicorum interpretationem , giving two reasons, first that 
St. Thomas’ commentary was based on that translation, second, quod, 
cum Aristotelem ad verbum interpretetur, agnoscere possumus, quale tum tem­
poris exemplar haberetur et inde libros quos nunc habemus, tam graecos, quam 
latinos, emendare (133v). He added punctuation and divided the text up 
into lectiones, ut si quis velit … graecos codices emendare, commoditate frua­
tur, nec diutius in querendo laboret. P. Vettori consulted for his edition of 
the Rhetoric of 1548 William’s translation, s. Schneider 1971, p. 73–76.
 38 I 1 1252a1–2 ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ 
πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν … a6–7 αὕτη 
δ‘ ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική.
 39 Quoniam omnem civitatem videmus communitatem quandam existentem …
haec autem est quae vocatur civitas et communicatio politica. The Trans­
latio imperfecta , however, did not make this change from communitas 
to communicatio when it presented: ipsa autem est que vocatur civitas et 
omnis communitas politica , Aristoteles Latinus , XXIX i, p. 3. Communi­
catio is used again at I 2 1252b15, p. 5.6 ed. Susemihl, but communitas 
b28, p. 6.9 ed. Susemihl. For William’s translation of the Rhetoric , s. 
Schneider 1971, p. 72: “Für dasselbe griechische Wort steht in seiner 
Version keineswegs immer dasselbe lateinische Wort.“
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words were left in the revised version, among them kalokagathia.40 
Verbeke41 justified this decision because kalokagathia stands for an 
ideal of classical Greek culture, whereas the ideal person of the 13th 
cent. A.D. was no longer the same as the one of Aristotle’s time. 
At best, a transliteration like that of kalokagathia can high­
light the foreign character of a term or concept and draw atten­
tion to it. If done discretely and with good judgment, a philo­
sophical text may benefit from this approach because important 
terms are marked and receive attention. Indeed, some terms in a 
text to be translated are so specific that they lack an equivalent in 
the language of the translation so it is desirable to leave them un­
translated because a new word coined after a Greek term could be 
adopted by the other language. A passage in Cicero Academica I42 
reveals that a number of Greek philosophical terms had become 
part of the Latin language in his time, however, the interlocutor 
Varro made an effort “to speak Latin” when expounding Greek 
philosophy and was very reluctant to expand the Latin vocabu­
lary, e.g. when introducing the term qualitas—a word that entered 
English, French, and German. We owe the words consistentia, ex­
sistentialis, inexsistens, and identitas43 to the translations of Marius 
Victorinus, all of which had a remarkable fortuna.
 40 Politics I 13 1259b34 f.; William p. 52.6 ed. Susemihl.
 41 Verbeke 1989, p. 8.
 42 Academica I 7.25 f. ‘Nos vero’ inquit Atticus; ‘quin etiam Graecis licebit utare 
cum voles, si te Latina forte deficient.’ Va. ‘Bene sane facis; sed enitar ut 
Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce modi verbis ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam 
aut physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus ut aliis multis consuetudo 
iam utitur pro Latinis. Furthermore, every technique has its specific vo­
cabulary. Therefore, aut enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina 
aut ex aliis transferenda. quod si Graeci faciunt qui in his rebus tot iam 
saecla versantur, quanto id nobis magis concedendum est, qui haec nunc 
primum tractare conamur.’ ‘Tu vero’ inquam ‘Varro bene etiam meriturus 
mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris ut effecisti, 
sed etiam verborum.’ Va. ‘Audebimus ergo’ inquit ‘novis verbis uti te auctore, 
si necesse erit. Then he uses initia for Greek archai, adding ut e Graeco 
vertam. Cf. later about the Platonic ‘form’: hanc illi ἰδέαν appellabant, 
iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere (8.30).
 43 Marti 1990, p. 25 f. Marti, p. 26 n. 9, points out that the coinage of new 
terms in Latin follows obviously the morphology of the Greek when 
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Verbeke did not offer a convincing defense of William’s strategy 
of retaining Greek words in transliteration. First, he did not limit 
transliterations to the sort of terms to which Verbeke’s arguments 
would apply. William appears to use transliterations more at ran­
dom; they seem necessitated by his verbum e verbo translation and 
used whenever he did not seem to have a Latin equivalent at his 
disposal for the Greek word found in his source.44 Secondly, trans­
lators of any period are confronted with the challenge of rendering 
concepts belonging to different eras and cultures for which there 
exists no perfect equivalent in their languages—the modern ideal 
of a man is probably even farther removed from that of the classi­
cal Greek era than that of the Medieval ages, and one could then 
generally justify transliteration as a legitimate translation strategy 
when a text to be translated belongs to a culture different from that 
of the translator. However, transliterations do not seem to be the 
appropriate response to this problem which most translators face. 
From the perspective of the reader, transliterations of words inter­
rupt the flow of a sentence or argument in the language into which 
the translator translates. In style, such a text lacks homogeneity 
and consistency. From the point of clarity, the transliteration of a 
word is counterproductive since it introduces a term unknown to 
the reader who is not familiar with the original language of the text. 
In this sense, a transliteration creates obscurity, a criticism voiced 
by Bruni. In his letter to the Archbishop of Milan,45 Bruni identi­
fies two flaws in the old translation: “Words were … either left as 
they were found in Greek, or they were placed differently in Latin 
than they will be placed by me” (verba … aut relicta sunt in Graeco, 
ut iacebant, aut aliter posita sunt in Latino, quam a me ponantur). As 
  as Latin equivalent of an abstract Greek noun, e.g. ταυτότης, identitas 
is chosen. Following the same principle, William of Moerbeke will 
render δρᾶμα by actitamen , Minio­Paluello 1972, p. 52.
 44 This was already recognized by Bruni, see below p. 38 n. 148. Vettori, 
in the preface to his commentary of Arist. Rhetoric , gives two rea­
sons for William’s habit of keeping Greek words: cum aut vim eorum 
non perciperet, aut, quomodo uno verbo reddi possent, non videret (cited by 
Schneider 1971, p. 74).
 45 Of 1438 (book 8.2 Luiso p. 137 f.)—for the passage quoted s. no. 5, p. 202 
ed. Birkenmajer.
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an example of the first point, that words are left in Greek, he cites 
the Greek word eutrapelia, which is kept by the previous translator 
but translated by Bruni as comitas. For kalouskagathous Bruni chose 
the translation honestos et bonos 46 and did not leave the impression 
that the Greek ideal had no counterpart in the Latin language. A 
different strategy used by translators was to add to the word they 
simply transliterated an explanation, as found in the Translatio vetus 
of Aristotle Rhetoric , e.g. at II 17 1391b2 philothei id est amici deorum.47 
James Schmidt sees in “Moerbeke’s strategy of translation … 
the considerable virtue of making it unmistakably clear where the 
language of the classical polis resists translation into that of the 
medieval civitas. When he found terms which could not be rendered 
into Latin he simply transliterated them from the Greek”, that is to 
say, he provides the historian with “clearly marked stress points.”48 
I am not convinced that there is such a rational principle behind all 
the cases in which William chose to transliterate words.49 One needs 
to point out that after all he actually chose to translate polis by civi­
tas (I 1 1252a1) and does not always leave politikos untranslated but 
chose civilis as well. The famous statement in Politics I 2 that “man 
is by nature an animal destined to live in a polis” is translated by 
him as homo natura civile animal est (p. 7.6 f. ed. Susemihl, s. below 
p. 43). William does not approach transliteration consistently. In 
any case, a translation that uses transliterations of words reminds 
the reader constantly that the text is a translation and stresses the 
foreignness of its content. It asks for additional clarification, which 
was the assumption in the scholastic tradition that separated the 
faithful, but not always clear, translation from the expected addi­
tional step of explanation, expositio (s. below p. 67).
Similar to transliterations is William’s strategy of creating 
new Latin words based on Greek etymology. Cicero had taken a 
moderate position on this issue, mindful of the fact that in spite 
of the richness of the Greek vocabulary, the Stoics had invented 
 46 Arist. Politics IV 8 1293b39, Bruni ed. 1469 f. 132v; Politics II 9 1271a23 
translated Bruni ed. 1469 f. 108r bonos et honestos.
 47 S. Schneider 1971, p. 18. S. below p. 27 n. 87.
 48 Schmidt 1986, p. 313 f.
 49 Cf. William’s rendering of poein for Aristotle’s ποιεῖν, s. below n. 153.
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many new terms. Therefore, the Romans could do the same.50 
The situation is, however, different after Cicero had expanded 
the Latin philosophical vocabulary. Under these circumstances it 
becomes more difficult to justify the coinage of new terms (s. be­
low p. 32; 39 n. 149). Bruni pays particular attention to it and re­
jects William’s practice vehemently, e.g. his translation of Greek 
πρόφασις (prophasis) by prolocutio:51
What does it mean, I ask you, “to speak for the sake of 
prolocution”? For if men speak to the people in a wise 
manner for the sake of prolocution, prolocution must in­
deed be something important. Therefore, instruct me, 
what it is. For until now I have never heard or read this 
word and I don’t understand what it means.52 If in a most 
far­off country of barbarians this word is in use, instruct 
me, what it means among barbarians “to speak for the 
sake of prolocution.” For I whose language is Latin do not 
understand your barbaric language.53
 50 De Finibus III 2.5, cf. 4.15.
 51 According to TLL vol. X, col. 1832, it is used by Claudius Mamertinus 
(4th cent. AD) in the meaning: actio vel potius effectus proloquendi, effa­
tum, which has nothing to do with Greek πρόφασις, i.e. pretext, false 
promise. In DuCange, Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis, vol. 6, 
p. 528, only one reference is given, in the meaning of colloquium. Differ­
ently Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, p. 374 n. 16: measured by the 
standards of medieval Latin, Bruni “somewhat tendentiously” overstat­
ed his criticism. However, it is quite ironic that Bruni himself did not 
know the meaning (and etymology) of πρόφασις when he translated 
προφάσεως ἕνεκα as ut exordii gratia dicatur (f. 69v ed. Paris 1526). He 
thought it was derived from the Greek verb φάναι instead of φαίνειν, 
cf. p. Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque: histoire 
des mots, Paris 1968–1980, 4 vols., p. 1171 s.v. φαίνω. 
 52 Bruni repeats this criticism with regard to William’s choice of leaving 
epiichiam in Greek: Cur tu ergo mihi ‘epiichiam’ relinquis in greco, verbum 
mihi ignotum? De Interpretatione [44] p. 120, cf. below p. 35 n. 131.
 53 Quid est queso ‘prolocutionis gratia loqui’? Si enim loquuntur homines ad 
populum sapienter gratia prolocutionis, magnum profecto aliquid debet 
esse prolocutio. doce me ergo, quid tandem sit! Nam ego id verbum num­
quam audivi hactenus neque legi nec, quid importet, intelligo. Si in ex­
trema barbarie id verbum in usu est, doce me, quid apud barbaros significet 
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William adopted a different strategy with regard to a different 
kind of a Greek compounds, i.e. adjectives that consist of two 
stems. Here, he translates one part, but leaves the other part 
untranslated. Greek ζῳοφάγα (zōiophaga), καρποφάγα (karpo­
phaga), or παμφάγα (pamphaga) are rendered even in William’s 
second version as animalifaga, fructifaga or omnifaga respectively,54 
or τεκνοποητική (teknopoiētikē) is translated as teknofactiva55 and 
ἰσοτύραννον (isotyrannon) as aequityrannum.56 Introducing such 
hybrid forms was not a common practice of medieval translators 
of Aristotle as L.J. Bataillon57 has pointed out. He draws atten­
tion to the fact that e.g. R. Grosseteste replaced eufortunium found 
in a previous translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics with 
bona fortuna (p. 297)—William will return in his translation of 
Aristotle’s Poetics of 1278 to eufortunium.58 When William found 
in Boethius’ earlier translation a rendering that avoided such 
hybrid words, he opted for re­introducing the hybrid form in 
his revision of that translation.59 John the Scot (c. 815–877) had 
remarked that there is no way to express Greek terms like homo­
ousion, homo agathon or homotheon in a single Latin word. He de­
cided to translate these by separate words since a translation that 
renders one word by one word fails.60 William seems to adhere 
‘prolocutionis gratia loqui’. Nam ego latinus istam barbariem tuam non intel­
ligo, Bruni, De Interpretatione [33] p. 106–108, on the phrase prolocutionis 
gratia loqui found in William’s translation (p. 428.3 ed. Susemihl) of 
προφάσεως ἕνεκα (prophaseōs heneka) at Arist. Politics IV 13 1297a14. 
 54 Arist. Politics I 8 1256a25, s. William p. 29.11 ed. Susemihl. Equally unat­
tractive, or cacophonous, is William’s rendering iamboficus for Arist. 
iambopoioi, Poetics 8 1451b14; Minio­Paluello 1972, p. 52.
 55 Arist. Politics I 3 1253b10; William p. 11.12 ed. Susemihl.
 56 II 9 1270b13 f.; William p. 123.3 ed. Susemihl, s. below p. 41 with n. 160.
 57 L.J. Bataillon, “L’usage des mots hybrids Gréco­Latins par Guillaume 
de Moerbeke,” in: Brams – Vanhamel (eds.) 1989, p. 295–299. 
 58 Minio­Paluello 1972, p. 52.
 59 Minio­Paluello 1972, p. 174, points out that ψευδογράφημα of Arist. 
Sophistical Refutations I 11 171b12 f. is translated falsa descriptio by 
Boethius, but falsigraphia by William. Ibid. p. 50 Minio­Paluello calls 
these forms “caratteristiche di Guglielmo”.
 60 J. Scotus, De Divisione Naturae II, in PL vol. 122, col. 567 C Quorum 
interpretatio de verbo ad verbum non exprimitur. 
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with regard to the word by word translation to a more purist, al­
most an extreme position whereas others like Boethius and John 
the Scot were willing to compromise. 
One notices that William was aware of the meaning of indi­
vidual Greek and Latin words. Aristotle at the beginning of the 
first chapter of Politics VII demands that a study of the best state 
required that one first explains the best life,61 what I paraphrased 
as “explain” is in Aristotle διορίσασθαι (diorisasthai), often trans­
lated as “define.”62 William of Moerbeke chose the translation de­
terminare. The stem termin­ corresponds exactly to that of the 
Greek διορίσασθαι which is derived from the stem ὅρος which 
means “boundary, border”. Not only is the semantic nuance of 
the Greek verb well preserved by William, but he seems to at­
tempt to reproduce the etymology of the Greek word as well. 
Jerome (ca 340–420 A.D.) reveals that Aquila of Sinope (2nd cent. 
A.D.) in his translation of the Hebrew Bible into Greek tried not 
only to transfer the words but their etymology as well.63 This is 
generally William’s objective which almost allows translating his 
rendering back into Greek. Aristotle’s σύνταξις (syntaxis) is in 
William’s translation coordinatio.64 
L. Minio­Paluello concisely described the difference between 
the approaches to translation followed by Boethius and Wil­
liam respectively: “Boethius wanted to translate Aristotle into 
Latin, Wilhelm wanted to accomplish that the Greek be read in 
Latin letters.”65 This method does not necessarily reveal a poor 
 61 Aristotle Politics VII 1 1323 a 14 περὶ δὲ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα 
ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη διορίσασθαι πρῶτον 
τίς αἱρετώτατος βίος.
 62 Liddell – Scott – Jones, A Greek­English Lexicon, 91996, s.v. διορίζω I 2. 
 63 Aquila autem, proselytus et contentiosus interpres, qui non solum uerba, 
sed etymologias uerborum transferre conatus est, iure proicitur a nobis, 
ep. 57.11.2.
 64 σύνταξις Arist. Politics II 6 1265b26; coordinatio William p. 91.26 ed. 
Susemihl, s. below p. 41.
 65 Minio­Paluello 1972, p. 174: “Boezio voleva rendere Aristotele in latino, 
Guilelmo voleva far legger il greco in lettere latine”. A similar judg­
ment as the one quoted about Wiliam, Minio­Paluello expressed about 
Robert Grosseteste (1950), ibid. p. 111.
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command of Latin on the part of William or a lack of under­
standing of Latin word order and syntax but an approach sanc­
tioned by a tradition of the ideal of the fidus interpres, as it was 
observed by Jerome (c. 347–420), although for him this applied 
only to a translation of the Holy Scriptures.66 In these texts the 
word order is a mystery67 that transcends human comprehension. 
It would be presumptuous for a translator to allow his limited 
understanding to potentially distort the truth of the authoritative 
text that has been made known through revelation. The word by 
word translation is the best guarantee against alterations of the 
original thought. The translation should be a copy of the original 
in a different language. The translator eliminates the possibility 
of misrepresenting the original and accepts the subordinate role 
of the interpreter who seeks to offer equivalent words for those of 
his source in the translation. The imperative for the translation 
is the closest adherence to the source not only in word order but 
also number of syllables if possible, without regard to the quality 
of style. Jerome’s ep. 57 (of 395 A.D.) reveals that this method of 
translation was expected by some to be followed even outside of 
the Scriptures because Jerome felt compelled to defend himself 
against the accusation that in translating Epiphanius’ letter to 
John of Jerusalem he did not adhere to this method of trans­
lation.68 Jerome is not apologetic about the fact that, except for 
the translation of the Scriptures in which he translated verbum e 
verbo, in translations of other Greek texts he expressed the sense 
of the text (ep. 57.5.2),69 and this, as he writes, was the method he 
adopted from his youth.70 He justifies it by referring to Cicero and 
Horace (s. above p. 12 n. 11). The verbum e verbo approach was lim­
ited to translations of the Scriptures. William of Moerbeke goes 
 66 S. Schwarz 1944, 73–77; Harth 1968, 45–56. For a nuanced discussion of 
the rather complex views of Jerome on translation s. Adler 1994.
 67 Jerome ep. 57.5.2.
 68 Ep. 57.2.3 me verbum non expressisse de verbo.
 69 Jerome ep. 57.5.2 libera voce profiteor me in interpretatione Graecorum 
absque scripturis sanctis, ubi et verborum ordo mysterium est, non verbum e 
verbo, sed sensum exprimere de sensu.
 70 Ep. 57.6.1 me semper ab adulescentia non uerba, sed sententias transtulisse.
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further in his translation of Aristotle’s works where he applies 
the ideal of the fidus interpres, originally reserved for translations 
of biblical texts, to the translation of philosophical works. He was 
not the first to do so. Boethius, in his commentary of the Isagoge 
Porphyrii, justifies a translation of verbum verbo with the argument 
that in works in which understanding of things is sought (in 
quibus rerum cognitio quaeritur) the uncorrupted truth and not the 
charm of a lucid style must be expressed.71 
 Jerome, as we saw (above n. 69), distinguished a verbum e verbo 
translation that is applied in the rendering of the Scriptures from 
a less literal translation he preferred in order to expresses the sense 
of Greek texts other than the Scriptures. The alternatives of either 
being faithful to the words or to the sense had already been ex­
pressed by Cicero in De optimo genere oratorum, and it is this work 
and the lines quoted above from Horace that Jerome cites when 
he justifies the translation that conveys the sense of the source. 
For Boethius, however, this alternative strategy adopted by Jerome 
is no longer viable, he “was the first to proclaim the principle of 
word­for­word translation for books that are not sacred.”72 Alfonso 
of Cartagena (1384–1456), later bishop of Burgos, will defend this 
concept of translation against the criticism of Bruni and his style 
of translating Aristotle (s. below p. 66 f.).
Moerbeke’s translation was the text on which Thomas of 
Aquinas and Albertus Magnus based their commentaries on Aris­
totle Politics.73 Political writings by a number of Medieval authors 
like John Quidort (c. 1255–1306), Dante (ca. 1265–1321), Marsilius 
of Padua (ca. 1270–ca. 1342), and Nicolaus of Cusa (1401–1464) 
reveal knowledge and influence of Aristotle’s Politics. There is a 
scholarly dispute about the degree of the impact Aristotle had. 
This question lies outside of the present study. A balanced view 
has been proposed by Francisco Bertelloni74 who argued that the 
 71 In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta, ed. secunda, I 1, CSEL vol. 48, 1906, p. 135.
 72 Schwarz 1944, p. 75.
 73 Thomas had been the first to use the new translations of William: 
Steele 1989, p. 62; for the date of Albertus’ commentary s. ibid. p. 65 f.
 74 Bertelloni 2007; cf. Ch. Flűeler, “Politischer Aristotelismus im Mittel­
alter,” Vivarium 40 (2002) p. 1–13.
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work of these thinkers was not only influenced by Aristotle’s polit­
ical and ethical philosophy but by earlier and contemporary legal, 
theological and other philosophical concepts as well. And some 
of these authors introduced ‘protomodern’ ideas that go beyond 
Aristotelian thinking while the knowledge of Aristotle’s political 
and ethical philosophy enabled them to express the new topics of 
their political theory in a clearer and better suited terminology.
2 . n i c o l e  o r e s m e
An attempt to translate the Latin version of Aristotle’s Politics by 
William of Moerbeke into French was made by Master Pierre de 
Paris around 1305. This translation is not preserved. William of 
Moerbeke’s translation was used by Nicole Oresme (c. 1323–1382) 
who produced in the second half of the 14th cent.75 a translation 
of Aristotle’s Politics into a modern language, French.76 His was 
the first translation of the Politics into a vernacular. King Charles 
V, at whose behest Oresme produced this translation, was aware 
that he could not reach the leading nobility, who would benefit 
from the study of the Aristotelian Politics, in the Latin language. 
The topics and theoretical concepts Nicole Oresme found in 
Aristotle’s Politics had never been dealt with before in the French 
language.77 It has been said that Nicole Oresme had to invent 
the target language.78 Nicole Oresme was aware of the difficulties 
linked to a French translation of the Politics. In the proem to his 
 75 Menut 1970, p. 19 f., shows that the first version of the translation by 
Nicole Oresme was completed already at the end of the same year in 
which it was begun, in 1371. The following two revisions, with mostly 
minor changes, affected the commentary and were completed in 1374.
 76 It has been edited by Menut 1970. For translations into a vernacular s. 
ibid. p. 26–30. The most recent chapter on Oresme is Gregorio 2008, 
p. 112–133 with extensive bibliography.
 77 He benefited from the commentary on the Politics by St. Thomas, s. Menut 
1970, p. 25; cf. Verbeke 1989, p. 12 n. 20; 13 n. 23. However, Oresme took 
over some mistakes too he found there: Verbeke, p. 14 n. 25.
 78 Gregorio 2008, p. 118.
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translation of the Nicomachean Ethics Nicole Oresme compares 
the two languages and puts Latin ahead of French in its perfec­
tion and abundance of vocabulary.79 It is remarkable that Nicole 
Oresme reminds here of the comments of classical Roman au­
thors concerning the difficulties of introducing Greek philosophy 
to Roman readers in their language.80 Oresme has been credited 
with enriching the French language with more than 1.000 words, 
30% of which are still used today.81
With regard to the approach to translating, one could argue 
that Nicole Oresme followed the practice of William of Moerbeke 
who at times simply transcribed a Greek word and attached the 
endings of Latin morphology, e.g. monarchizabant.82 William’s de­
mocratizari 83 becomes in Nicole Oresme democratizer.84 And at the 
beginning of the first chapter of Politics VII to which I referred 
already (p. 22), Aristotle states that those who enjoy the best po­
litical conditions lead the best life. The Greek expression “enjoy 
political conditions” is πολιτευομένους (politeuomenous), derived 
of a verb connected with the stem πολιτεία (politeia), or more 
exact πολίτευμα (politeuma). William of Moerbeke translated the 
participle πολιτευομένους (politeuomenous) with a relative clause 
qui politizant, where the verb is a neologism85 taken over directly 
from the Greek. Here and often elsewhere, Nicole Oresme sim­
ply continued this practice of leaving words untranslated when 
he took over the Latin word found in William of Moerbeke’s 
translation and added the endings of a French verb.86 William’s 
qui politizant becomes qui politizent et gouvernent tres bien—the 
 79 Menut 1970, p. 27.
 80 E.g. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura I 139, cf. Fögen 2000.
 81 Menut 1970, p. 11; 28. The influence of Nicole Oresme’s translation of 
the Politics could be compared with the impact the translation of the 
bible by Martin Luther had in Germany. 
 82 Arist. Politics IV 10 1295a16 μοναρχεῖν; William p. 415.7 ed. Susemihl 
monarchizabant.
 83 Translation of Politics VI 5 1320a3, p. 475.6 ed. Susemihl.
 84 Oresme p. 266 col. 1 ed. Menut.
 85 It is not listed in TLL or in Du Cange.
 86 Menut 1970, p. 28.
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awkwardness of the neologism politizent is mitigated by the ex­
planatory et gouvernent tres bien.87 
However, given the success of Nicole Oresme’s coinage of 
new words—among them the very word “politique”88—he cannot 
be accused of a ‘barbarous’ practice, of a poor use of the language 
into which he was translating, as Humanists have characterized 
the earlier medieval translations into Latin.89 Just the opposite: 
he displays good judgment in minor details. Aristotle’s expres­
sion at Politics I 2. 1252b10 καὶ ὀρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας (kai 
orthōs Hēsiodus eipe poiēsas) was translated by William as et recte 
Hesiodus dixit poetizans 90, but by Nicole Oresme as “et pour cet 
disoit bien Esiodus en parlant comme poëte.”91
Nicole Oresme’s translation was successful enough so that it 
took almost 200 years until in 1568 Louis Le Roy issued a new 
translation of Aristotle’s Politics into French which made that of 
Nicole Oresme obsolete.92
 87 S. Menut 1970, p. 28. There is a tradition of “lezioni doppie”, that is of 
explaining one Greek word by two terms in the translation, connected 
by seu, vel or id est, cf. Minio­Paluello 1972, p. 51; 108–111; Schneider 
1971, p. 19 f., s. above p. 19. 
 88 Menut 1970, p. 28. The German word “Politik” with the stress on the 
last syllable goes back to French “politique” (see J. Grimm – W. Grimm, 
Deutsches Wörterbuch, vol. 7, Leipzig 1889, col. 1979)—“politique” was 
introduced into the French language by Nicole Oresme. Ultimately 
the German term owes its existence to Nicole Oresme’s translation of 
Aristotle’s Politis.
 89 Bruni will argue that the Latin language possessed words for everything 
that was expressed in Greek, cf. De Interpretatione [43] p. 120; s. below 
p. 39 with n. 149. For Bruni’s charge of barbarism against the transla­
tion of William cf. ibid. [11] p. 82; [33] p. 106; [42] p. 118, cf. Bruni, Prae­
missio Ethicorum p. 76–77 ed. Baron, translated by Griffiths, Hankins, 
Thompson 1987, IV:2, p. 213; Praemissio Politicorum p. 74 ed. Baron, 
translated by Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, II 7:VI, p. 162–164; 
Bruni’s letter to F. Picolpassi of Oct. 15 1435, book 7.4 (p. 127 f. Luiso), 
no 3, p. 191 ed. Birkenmajer. This charge is repeated by Vettori regard­
ing William’s translation of Arist. Rhetoric in the preface to his com­
mentary, cited by Schneider 1971, p. 74.
 90 p. 4–5 Susemihl.
 91 p. 47 Menut.
 92 Menut 1970, p. 30; Gregorio 2008, p. 112 n. 4.
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3 . l e o n a r d o  b r u n i ’ s  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t r a n s l at i o n 
In the second half of the 14th cent. Oresme produced a translation 
of Aristotle’s Politics into a modern language in order to reach the 
leading nobility which was to benefit from the study of this work. 
Leonardi Bruni d’Arezzo (1369 –1444) addressed a somewhat dif­
ferent audience93 with his translation of the Politics into Latin 
from the year 1437.94 The language Bruni employed was not the 
vernacular,95 into which by the end of the 13th century not only 
 93 Hankins 2003, p. 180 f. describes this as the upper class in Italian city 
states who had received a humanist education and would now have ac­
cess to translations that were “written in a style similar to the classical 
authors he had learned to enjoy in school.” 
 94 Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, p. 379 n. 24, cf. Baron 1928, 175 f. 
 95 R.R. Bolgar, The classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries, Cambridge 1958, 
p. 277, argued that the first translators from the Greek were “popularis­
ers … they wrote less for the learned specialists than for the common 
mass of educated men”, but is not “the common mass of educated men” 
a contradictio in adjecto? Hankins 2006b, p. 133–147, considers Bruni’s 
activity of “discarding the difficult medieval version and retranslating 
the work into a more accessible literary Latin” as an attempt “to pop­
ularize Aristotle’s Ethics.” Bruni’s decision to produce a better Latin 
translation than his predecessors should not be construed as part of 
an elitist movement. Hankins rejects the interpretation that Bruni’s 
literary activity appealed only to an audience of professionals who read 
Latin and points out that many of Bruni’s Latin texts were translated 
into the vernacular (s. Hankins in: Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, 
p. 45 with n. 162 on p. 353–355). Hankins makes the same arguments in: 
2006a. However, it was really beyond Bruni’s control that some of his 
Latin translations were translated by others into a vernacular, which 
goes to show that there was a demand for such translations. As De 
Interpretatione reveals Bruni was deeply irritated (he felt “felt pain and 
anger”, s. below p. 34 n. 126) by the poor quality of the medieval trans­
lation, and this should be believed. It was after all a disagreement about 
the proper use of Latin which Bruni allowed to cause serious tensions 
with Coluccio Salutati, his former patron, cf. Witt 2000, p. 395–398. 
Bruni’s claim was to enable those who knew Latin but not Greek to 
read Aristotle: Praemissio Politicorum p. 74 ed. Baron, cited below n. 111. 
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classical Latin texts like Cicero’s speeches and his rhetorical trea­
tise De inventione had been translated,96 but Aristotle’s Nicomache­
an Ethics as well.97 Bruni did not avail himself of the vernacular 
in order to make his translations available to a wider readership, 
rather he used the same language as the earliest translator of the 
Politics. Botley98 observed that “all of Bruni’s Aristotelian trans­
lations were re­translations of texts available in medieval ver­
sions.” Bruni’s goal was to replace these translations, to get rid of 
the obscurity he found in them99 and to enhance the understand­
ing (cognitio)100 of Aristotle’s works. Bruni’s objections against 
the medieval translator were not without precedence. Already Je­
rome had pointed out that what is translated ad verbum not only 
sounds absurd,101 but obscures the sense as well.102 In his transla­
tions he did not compromise with regard to sense, even if some­
 96 Translated by Brunetto Latini (c. 1220–1294), incomplete, s. Witt 2000, 
p. 183–185.
 97 Translated by Taddeo Alderotti (1210–1295) into Tuscan, from the Latin 
translation by Herman the German, s. Witt 2000, p. 180.
 98 Botley 2004, p. 41.
 99 Bruni, Dialogus p. 58 ed. Garin. Cf. Bruni’s charge that William’s trans­
lation did not clarify, but obscured the understanding of the text, De 
Interpretatione [44] p. 120; Bruni, Praemissio Politicorum p. 74 ed. Baron 
(per enigmata), translated in: Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, II 
7:VI, p. 162–164. Related is the charge that the previous translation of 
the Nicomachean Ethics was “confused” (qua nihil est turbatius): Bruni, 
Praemissio Ethicorm p. 77 ed. Baron, translated by Griffiths, Hankins, 
Thompson 1987, IV 2, p. 213. In Vita Aristotelis, p. 46 ed. Baron, Bruni 
blames the translator for the perception of readers who consider Aris­
totle to be intricatum quemdam et obscurum et inconcinnum.
 100 See below p. 58 f. He accuses William of accomplishing the opposite: 
Hoc non est interpretari, sed confundere, nec lucem rebus, sed caliginem 
adhibere, De Interpretatione [44] p. 120. This is almost a topos since 
Coluccio Salutati in his letter to Pietro Corsini tried in his revision of 
the translation of Plutarch’s De ira by Simon Atumano, opusculum illud 
de sue translationis obscuritate planiore dicendi genere in lucem intelligentie 
revocare, Epistolario, book VIII, no. 23, vol. II, p. 483 ed. Novati. He 
contrasts its obscuritas with not only the venustas, dulcedo, ornatus, but 
as well the perspicuitas of translations by Cicero, Jerome, Ambrosius, 
Boethius, and others (p. 482).
 101 Si ad uerbum interpretor, absurde resonant, ep. 57.5.7, repeated 11.4.
 102 Ex alia in aliam linguam ad uerbum expressa translatio sensus operit, ep. 57.6.1.
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thing about the words might be missing.103 Later John the Scot 
(c. 815–877), in his introduction to the translation of Dionysius 
Areopagita, entertained the possibility that his translation could 
be judged obscuram minusque apertam and expressed fear that he 
has committed the fault of the faithful translator (ne forte culpam 
fidi interpretis incurram).104 Even John the Scot who himself fol­
lowed the method of the faithful translation is aware of possible 
problems this approach causes for a reader. John the Scot echoed 
Boethius who in his commentary of Porphyry’s Isagogē had ex­
pressed his concern that he committed the fault of the faithful 
translator (ne subierim fidi interpretis culpam) by translating verbum 
e verbo.105 As noted before (p. 11), Cicero in his translation wanted 
to be faithful to the sense of the source (sententiis isdem, De optimo 
genere oratorum 5.14), not the words. 
Bruni wanted to accomplish his goal by using a form of Lat­
in that imitated classical prose, a language that could be called 
Latin,106 freed from the ‘barbaric’ blunders committed by previous 
translators. He sought to preserve in his Latin translation the el­
egance of the Greek philosophical text so that the Greek authors 
themselves would not be embarrassed to the degree that they 
would deny that they were the authors of the works translated 
(see below p. 58 n. 222). In doing so, he played the leading part in 
the effort to restore the proper use of the classical Latin language 
and to revive Latin literary culture.107 
 103 Transposui, ut nihil desit ex sensu, cum aliquid desit ex uerbis, ep. 57.6.2.
 104 PL vol. 122, col. 1032 C, cited by Schwarz 1944, p. 73.
 105 In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta, CSEL vol. 48, 1906, p. 135.
 106 At the end of Praemissio Ethicorum Bruni claims that in his translation 
he for the first time made these books to be Latin whereas before they 
were not (illud assecutum me puto, ut hos libros nunc primum Latinos 
fecerim, cum antea non essent): p. 81 ed. Baron, translated by Griffiths, 
Hankins, Thompson 1987, IV:2, p. 217. This sounds like Balbus’ com­
ment on Cicero’s Aratea, his translation of Aratus: “they give him so 
much pleasure because they are Latin”, (Aratea) ita me delectant quia 
Latina sunt, De Natura Deorum II 41 104, s. below n. 189. cf. Coluccio 
Salutati in his letter to Pietro Corsini, on the revision of a translation 
of Plutarch’s De ira: pro semigreca translatione remitto tibi latinum trac­
tatum, Epistolario, book VIII, no. 23, vol. II, p. 483 ed. Novati.
 107 S. Hankins in: Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, p. 344 n. 6.
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Since Cicero’s Latin prose style 108 was the model to emulate 
in Bruni’s rendering of Aristotle’s Politics, Bruni did not share 
Cicero’s intention of introducing in his philosophical writings 
Greek philosophy in Rome in a living language, the language 
used by his contemporaries in his country, the vernacular—in 
this regard Nicole Oresme came closer to Cicero’s mission and 
had understood himself as doing something similar to Cicero.109 
Bruni’s translation was for the benefit of the smaller circle of 
learned readers110 familiar with Latin,111 a dead language, and 
this was intended: it was actually the truly erudite men (homines 
ingenue eruditi) who had been turned off by the ‘barbaric’ qual­
ity of the old translation of the Nicomachean Ethics. These men 
embraced his new translation.112 On the other hand, in his letter 
to the Signori of Siena of Nov. 24 1438 Bruni expected his new 
translation of the Politics to be not only of the greatest usefulness 
to rulers of republics, but hoped that an opportunity would be 
created for the citizens to read it.113 Furthermore, if the use of 
 108 S. Hankins in Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, p. 199 f. In this 
“first Ciceronianism”, however, humanists did not yet follow slavishly 
Cicero’s use of vocabulary or syntax, Witt 2000, p. 403.—As Bruni’s 
model for judging the medieval translations serves as well Boethius. 
After listing some of the merely transliterated Greek words in the ear­
lier translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, Bruni adds: Haec a Boëthio 
longe absunt, viro in utraque lingua docto et eleganti, letter to F. Picolpassi 
of Oct. 15 1435, book 7.4 (p. 127 f. Luiso), no 3, p. 191 ed. Birkenmajer. 
 109 S. Gregorio 2008, p. 116. 
 110 Cf. Bruni in his letter to Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, of 1437, trans­
lated by Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, II 7: 2, p. 157: the Duke 
has compelled him “to do what you thought would be of benefit to 
men of learning”, referring to the completion of his translation of the 
Politics.
 111 Bruni, Praemissio Politicorum p. 74 ed. Baron, translated by Griffiths, 
Hankins, Thompson 1987, II 7:VI, p. 163: he wanted to give to those 
qui Latina utuntur lingua, ignaris Graecarum litterarum the opportunity 
to read the text without the obscurities of the old translation.
 112 Bruni, Praemissio Politicorum p. 74 ed. Baron, translated in: Griffiths, 
Hankins, Thompson 1987, II 7:VI, p. 163.
 113 no. 20 p. 143 ed. Baron, book 8.7 (p. 140 f. Luiso), translated by Griffiths, 
Hankins, Thompson 1987, II 7:VIII, p. 165 f. In the Praemissio Poli­
ticorum p. 74 ed. Baron, translated in: Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 
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Latin limited access to his translation in Italy, it allowed it on 
the other hand to be of more than regional importance, it allowed 
this translation to be studied outside of Italy, so in England 114 or 
Spain,115 and to reach “the most remote shores of the earth” (ex­
tremas terrarum oras).116 Latin was after all not only the language 
of philosophical discourse during the Renaissance but the main 
literary language of the entire West.
Bruni’s task was easier than that of Cicero or Nicole Oresme 
who had to forge a terminology for the subject matter of the texts 
they translated. As translator, Bruni did not need to take over 
Greek words to convey ideas which otherwise could not be ex­
pressed in Latin. In the Latin of Cicero, Bruni found a language 
perfectly suited for his objective because Cicero had expanded the 
use of Latin to include philosophical terminology and a vocabu­
lary for the ethical and political issues addressed by Aristotle. In 
his treatise Cicero Novus (1415) Bruni credited Cicero with having 
been the first to treat philosophy in Rome and adding words to the 
Latin language which allowed one “to express the findings and 
controversies of the philosophers more clearly and easily.”117 Bruni 
who was well versed in the Latin of Cicero—Alfonso of Cartagena 
1987, II 7:VI, p. 163, he refers to civibus meis as the readers who would 
benefit from the opportunity to read the text without the obscurities 
of the old translation. Is this an audience described after Cicero who 
in De Finibus I 3.7 wrote: si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, 
ut verterunt nostri poetae fabulas, male, credo, mererer de meis civibus, si 
ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. He considers the 
benefit his translation would have for the citizens.
 114 By Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, see Bruni’s letter to him of March 12 
1433, no. 18 p. 138–140 ed. Baron, book 6.14 (p. 122 f. Luiso), translated 
by Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, II 7:I, p. 154 f., and Bruni’s let­
ter of 1437, translated by Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, II 7:II, 
p. 156 f.
 115 By the king of Aragon, cf. Bruni’s letter of March 4 1441, book 9.2 
(p. 148 f. Luiso); translated by Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, II 
7: IX, p. 166–168.
 116 Cf. his letter to F. Picolpassi of Oct. 15 1435, book 7.4 (p. 127 f. Luiso), no 
3, p. 187 ed. Birkenmajer.
 117 Translated by Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, III 2, p. 187. 
Cf. Bruni, Dialogus p. 54 ed. Garin. 
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called him “novellus Cicero”,118 and Antonio da Rho and Erasmus 
“alter Cicero”119—could simply make use of what was available. 
4 . b r u n i ’ s  t r a n s l at i o n  o f  a r i s tot l e ’ s  p o l i t i c s
The end of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 120 contains a transition 
to the Politics. From a systematic point of view, Aristotle wanted 
the Nicomachean Ethics to be understood as a philosophical trea­
tise that preceded the Politics. Bruni when translating these two 
works of Aristotle follows the same order121—the translation of 
the Nicomachean Ethics was completed by 1417122 and that of the 
Politics dates from 1437.123 
Bruni justified his translation of the Nicomachean Ethics in his 
treatise De Interpretatione recta.124 In this work he defended himself 
against critics who had charged him with being too harsh in his 
 118 Liber Alphonsi episcopi Burgensis, no. 2, p. 164 ed. Birkenmajer. Bruni re­
fers to this judgment in his letter to F. Picolpassi of 1438, book 8.2 
(p. 137 f. Luiso), no 5 p. 195 ed. Birkenmajer.
 119 Antonio da Rho, s. Seigel 1968, p. 113 n. 31; Erasmus s. Th. Zielinski, 
Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte , Darmstadt 51967, 345 n. to p. 181.
 120 Nicomachean Ethics X 10 1181b15 ff.
 121 It should be noted that for Bruni the branch of philosophy that deals 
with action consists of three parts, ethics, household management, and 
politics: Praefatio Oeconomicorum Aristotelis (of 1420), no. 10, p. 120–121 
ed. Baron, translated by Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, VII 2, 
p. 305 f. This partition of philosophy is older, it was already used by 
Aelius Aristides in Stobaios Eklogai II 147 26 f. Wachsmuth; Boethius, 
In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta I 3, CSEL 48, 1906, p. 7–9, then by 
Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville, s. Flüeler 1992, vol. 1, p. 2 f. 
 122 Botley 2004, p. 42.
 123 The great number of letters and dedications proves how important 
Bruni considered this translation to be, Baron 1928, p. XXI f.
 124 According to Baron 1928, p. 165 f., it was written at the beginning or 
in the middle of the 1420s; Viti 2004, p. 54 f.; 68 f. follows this view. 
P. Thiermann, Die Orationes Homeri des Leonardo Bruni Aretino, Leiden 
1993, 119–125, argued that the edition of the Politics predated De In­
terpretatione, cf. Botley 2004, p. 42 n. 173. However, the contradiction 
between some of the principles espoused in De Interpretatione and the 
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criticism of earlier translators of this work.125 Bruni responded 
that he had reacted so severely because he felt pain and anger 
when he saw books that had been composed with so much el­
egance smeared with dirt in Latin.126 In order to demonstrate that 
not only orators but philosophers as well wrote in an elegant 
style 127 he cites, in translation, passages from Plato’s Phaedrus and 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics.128 He then proceeds 
to present examples of blunders found in a previous translation 
of an Aristotelian text. Given that one objective of this treatise 
is to defend himself against the charge of severely criticizing a 
previous translation of the Nicomachean Ethics it is understand­
able that he focuses now on the translation of a different work, 
the Politics. This strengthens his case because the blunders are 
not limited to the previous translation of the Nicomachean Ethics 
but are also found in that of the Politics, which Bruni assumes 
to be the work of the same translator (idem traductor) as that of 
  practice of Bruni’s translation seems more difficult to accept if De In­
terpretatione and the translation of the Politics fall almost in the same 
time. 
 125 “Bruni’s own behavior was not exactly diplomatic,” Hankins 2003, 
p. 194. Battista de’ Giudici († 1484) reacts to Bruni’s introduction, stat­
ing that the combination of eloquence and arrogance in Bruni had the 
effect that he could hardly read his work without revulsion, vix eius 
scripta sine stomacho legere possum, in Grabmann 1926, p. 443 n. 9.
 126 Bruni, De Interpretatione [2] p. 74: Ego autem fateor me paulo vehemen­
tiorem in reprehendendo fuisse, sed accidit indignatione animi, quod, cum 
viderem eos libros in greco plenos elegantie, plenos suavitatis, plenos in­
estimabilis cuiusdam decoris, dolebam profecto mecum ipse atque angebar 
tanta traductionis fece coinquinatos ac deturpatos eosdem libros in latino 
videre. The same ‘fecal’ expression is found as well in Bruni’s letter 
to F. Picolpassi of Oct. 15 1435, book 7.4 (p. 127 f. Luiso), no 3, p. 192 
ed. Birkenmajer. Did Vettori cite Bruni when in the preface to his com­
mentary of Arist. Rhetoric he remarked how much disgust (fastidium) 
he experienced when he used William’s translation in order to find out 
si ex faece illa sinceri aliquid purique depromi, atque erui coniuectura possit 
(cited by Schneider 1971, p. 74)?
 127 For elegantia s. De Interpretatione [2] p. 74; [6] p. 78; [32] p. 104; [36] 
p. 112; suavitas [2] p. 74; [45] p. 120; decus [2] p. 74; maiestas [13] p. 84; 
[16] p. 86; [29] 102. 
 128 De Interpretatione [19] p. 88—[28] p. 100.
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the Nicomachean Ethics 129—falsely.130 Only at the end of this trea­
tise, before justifying again the tone of his criticism of the earlier 
translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, does he take issue with the 
earlier translator who in his translation of the Nicomachean Ethics 
left epiichiam transliterated from Greek.131
In this treatise De Interpreatione 132 he demands a thorough 
command of both languages from a translator,133 first of the foreign 
language of the text he translates ([6] p. 78) in order to recognize 
the learned allusions and in particular poetical quotations which 
are cited out of context and don’t fit into the new context accord­
ing to the rules of syntax. Bruni lived up to this expectation: The 
progress in Bruni’s translation of the Politics over that of William 
is a better grasp of the realia. The Cretan poet Epimenides who 
is in William’s translation Epimenides autem okres 134—he certainly 
 129 Bruni, De Interpretatione [31] p. 102: Aristoteles in libro Politicorum quarto 
(utriusque enim operis idem fuit traductor, nec refert, ex illo vel hoc exempla 
sumantur) … 
 130 The translator was Robert Grosseteste, s. Viti 2004, p. 187 f. On the oth­
er hand, in his letter to F. Picolpassi of Oct. 15 1435, book 7.4 (p. 127 f. 
Luiso), no 3, p. 192 ed. Birkenmajer, Bruni distinguishes between an 
interpretatio vetus of Aristotle’s Ethics which is a translation from an 
Arabic source and an interpretatio novior a Britanno quodam traducta.—
Grosseteste’s translation was later revised. It is disputed whether Wil­
liam or some anonymous translator of the 13th cent. undertook this 
task, cf. Vanhamel 1989, 337–339.
 131 De Interpretatione [44] p. 120 (cited above p. 20 n. 52). Cf. Bruni’s letter to 
F. Picolpassi of Oct. 15 1435, book 7.4 (p. 127 f. Luiso), in Birkenmajer 
no 3, p. 187; and book 8.2 (p. 137 f. Luiso), in Birkenmajer no 5, p. 208 
(epiicheam). 
 132 Some of the views expressed here are mentioned in Bruni’s letter to 
Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, of March 12 1433, no. 18, p. 138–140 
ed. Baron, book 6.16 9 (p. 122 f. Luiso), translated by Griffiths, 
Hankins, Thompson 1987, II 7:1, p. 154 f.
 133 De Interpretatione [5] p. 76. Already Roger Bacon had demanded this: 
oportet quod translator sciat linguam a qua transfert, et linguam, in quam 
transfert, in: J.S. Brewer, Fr. Rogeri Bacon, Compendium Studii Philoso­
phiae, London 1859 (repr. 1965), cap. VIII, p. 471. See R. Lemay, “Roger 
Bacon’s Attitude Toward the Latin Translations and Translators of the 
Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries”, in: J. Hackett (ed.), Roger Bacon 
and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays, Leiden 1997, p. 25–47.
 134 William p. 5.5 ed. Susemihl, translation of Arist. Politics I 2 1252b14 f. 
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did not understand okres himself—is in Bruni’s version Epimenides 
vero cretensis 135, Epimenides from Crete, a reading based on identi­
fying the first vowel in ὁ Κρῆς (ho Krēs) as the article.136 
With his expectations for the qualification of a translator, 
Bruni goes beyond the requirement of linguistic competence, 
rather he demands from the translator familiarity with the litera­
ture in that language, including poetry, so that he understands 
all facets of the literary quality of the text to be translated. The 
translator has to know the literary culture of the language from 
which he translates. Here Bruni inserts a few examples of quota­
tions from Homer found in Aristotle’s Politics.137 
With regard to proprietas or significatio verbi that is so important 
for medieval translators Bruni introduces in a letter138 a distinction 
unknown to them, that is ex vi ipsius verbi and ex usu. Vis is the 
meaning of a word in its etymological sense whereas usus takes 
into account the testimonium scriptorium; in De Interpretatione he uses 
for the latter consuetudo, the customary meaning.139 This affects po­
litical terminology on which Bruni’s judgment is particularly strict. 
He demands that the translator masters the target language well 
enough to distinguish terms and not to use e.g. urbs instead of 
civitas.140 This brief remark is in fact a reckoning with the Medieval 
 135 Bruni ed. Paris 1526 f. 2r.
 136 Errors in translations caused because of reading two (or three) words as 
one are found as well in the Translatio vetus of the Rhetoric, cf. Schneider 
1971, p. 24; failure to recognize a name ibid. p. 27; wrong separation of 
Greek words ibid. p. 23 f. For Bruni’s conjectures and corrections of the 
Greek text cf. Hankins in: Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, p. 13.
 137 Bruni, De Interpretatione [9] p. 80, refering to Arist. Politics III 16 1287b14 
and 5 1278a37. In his treatise De Studiis et litteris of 1424, Bruni recom­
mends to Battista Malatesta of Montefeltro, a young woman who is the 
recipient of this letter, reading the poets since all distinguished men had a 
knowledge of them, and refers first to Aristotle who very often cited lines 
of Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, Euripides and others, p. 13 f.; 18 ed. Baron, 
translated by Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, V:2, p. 246; 249.
 138 Letter to F. Picolpassi of 1438, book 8.2 (p. 137 f. Luiso), no 5, p. 202 
ed. Birkenmajer.
 139 De Interpretatione [11] p. 82; [35] p. 110. This was already Cicero’s term, s. 
above p. 11 n. 9; p. 17 n. 42.
 140 Ibid. [11] p. 82: Deinde linguam eam, ad quam traducere vult, sic … norit, ne 
… urbem pro civitate dicat.
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tradition in which Greek politeia was translated by urbanitas, e.g. by 
Robert Grosseteste, Albertus Magnus and Thomas of Aquinas.141
Related is a distinction between verba and sententia verborum 
which is roughly equivalent to the literary sense of a word and the 
idiomatic meaning it receives in a certain context.142 The latter in­
cludes attention a translator has to give to the sense or meaning of 
an argument. It was Cicero who in De optimo genere oratorum 5.14, 
when explaining the principles he was to follow in his translation, 
rejected a method of verbum pro verbo like an interpres but remained 
faithful to the ideas (sententiis isdem) and the form in which they 
were expressed like an orator. Jerome had followed this approach 
since his youth (s. above p. 23 n. 70). Already Coluccio Salutati 
and Bruni’s teacher of Greek, Chrysoloras (ca. 1350 –1414), had ad­
vocated the ad sententiam translation.143 Chrysoloras was quite spe­
cific when he required that translators who reproduce the sense 
of the source follow the principle that the propriety of the Greek 
text in no way be sacrificed as if it were a law.144
 141 S. Minio Paluello 1972, p. 290–296—the alternative was civilitas, cf. 
Bertelloni 2007.
 142 Bruni, De Interpretatione [7] p. 78: cum aliud verba, aliud sententia verbo­
rum significet. Among the examples he cites is desiderati milites which 
in this context means that the soldiers died (periere). 
 143 Coluccio Salutati in his letter to Pietro Corsini: being annoyed with 
the quality of a previous translation of Plutarch’s De ira he aspired 
to remove obscurity. And while this would not allow to read Plutarch 
literally, nihil tamen quo ad sententiam nos lateret, Epistolario, book VIII, 
no. 23, vol. II, p. 483 ed. Novati; cf. Hankins 1991, vol. 1, p. 44 f.; id. 
2003, p. 177 with n. 1; 2007, p. 335 f. At the beginning of the 14th cent., 
translators of Latin texts into the vernacular had faced this prob­
lem, such as Bartolomeo da San Concordio who translated Sallust’s 
Catilinae coniuratio around 1302 in Florence and stated in the preface 
that Latin and the vernacular do not correspond completely and that 
it was, therefore, “appropriate to depart somewhat from the words, in 
order to express the thought and to be able to speak more clearly and 
without subtlety” (“si conviene uscire alquanto dele parole per ispo­
nere la sentenzia e per potere parlare più chiaro e aperto”), cited by 
Witt, 2000, p. 187 with n. 53 (Witt’s translation).
 144 Cf. the report by Cincius Romanus cited by Keßler 1995, p. XI n. 16 
Sed ad sententiam transferre opus esse aiebat hoc pacto, ut ii qui huiusmodi 
rebus operam darent, legem sibi indicerent, ut nullo modo proprietas greca 
mutaretur.
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Bruni stresses in De Interpretatione the difficulty of the task of 
translating. It is in this context that he expresses his high opin­
ion of the style of Aristotle and Plato. He argues that both em­
ployed the most elegant style of writing, filled with sayings of 
the old poets, orators, and historians. It is important to note 
that in the judgment on the literary quality of the Greek philoso­
phers, Aristotle and Plato are not only referred to in one breath 
but that Aristotle is mentioned first and his name is not simply 
attached, as a kind of afterthought, to that of Plato.145 However, 
Bruni goes beyond this in making the point that individual au­
thors have their own specific style which the translation must 
reproduce—Bruni actually argues that the translator is swept 
away into the style of his source by its own force 146 and cannot do 
justice to the sense of the text unless he follows its stylistic struc­
ture.147 Furthermore, Bruni demands that the translator does not, 
because of his insufficient command of the language into which 
he translates, keep from his source certain terms in Greek.148 He 
takes it as a sign of the greatest ignorance to leave Greek words 
untranslated since the Latin language possesses the most fitting 
expressions. 
 145 Bruni, De Interpretatione [6] p. 78: presertim cum Aristoteles ipse et Plato 
summi, ut ita dixerim, magistri litterarum fuerint ac usi sint elegantissimo 
scribendi genere veterum poetarum et oratorum et historicorum dictis sen­
tentiisque referto, et incidant frequenter tropi figureque loquendi, que aliud 
ex verbis, aliud ex consuetudine preiudicata significant.
 146 Ibid. [14] p. 86 Rapitur enim vi ipsa in genus dicendi illius de quo transfert. 
Arist. Politics VIII 7 1342b9 ff. expresses a similar idea when he told 
the anecdote about Philoxenos who wanted to compose a dithyram­
bus in the Dorian mode but “by the very nature (of this genre) fell 
back into the Phrygian harmony as the fitting mode”, ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως 
αὐτῆς ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὴν φρυγιστὶ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἁρμονίαν πάλιν. 
 147 Bruni, De Interpretatione [14] p. 84–86. 
 148 Bruni makes this requirement in the case of ut verbum verbo reddendum 
fuerit ibid. [11] p. 82. He, therefore, does not reject this practice of 
translation per se but seems to indicate that this method is particu­
larly prone to transliteration, cf. ibid. [34] p. 108, see above p. 19.
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5 . t H e  p o l i t i c a l  t e r m i n o l o g y  i n  b r u n i ’ s  t r a n s l at i o n — 
a  n e W  H u m a n i s t  c o n c e p t  o f  r e s  p u b l i c a ?
Bruni claims that nothing has been said in Greek that could not 
be said in Latin.149 In particular Bruni criticizes that at many 
places the previous translator of the Politics leaves the Greek 
word for constitution politia 150 instead of using res publica and 
that he inserted unnecessarily the terms for individual constitu­
tions oligarchia, democratia and aristocratia instead of using e.g. 
popularis status for democracy.151 He claims that such a translation 
looks half­Greek152—if Bruni had known William’s translation of 
 149 Cf. already Cic. De Finibus I 3 10: the Latin language is locupletior, 
cf. above p. 27 n. 89. 
 150 Politia is used as well by Robert Grosseteste, Albertus Magnus, Thomas 
of Aquinas and Tolomeo di Lucca, s. Minio­Paluello 1972, p. 290–294.
 151 Bruni, De Interpretatione [43] p. 120: Quid de verbis in greco relictis dicam, 
que tam multa sunt, ut semigreca quedam eius interpretatio videatur? Atqui 
nihil grece dictum est, quod latine dici non possit! … Enim vero, quorum 
optima habemus vocabula, ea in greco relinquere ignorantissimum est. 
Quid enim tu mihi ‘politiam’ relinquis in Greco, cum possis et debeas latino 
verbo ‘rem publicam’ dicere? Cur tu mihi ‘oligar chiam’ et ‘democratiam’ et 
‘aristocratiam’ mille locis inculcas et aures legentium insuasissimis ignotis­
simisque nomi nibus offendis, cum illorum omnium optima et usi ta tis ssima 
vocabula in latino habeamus? Latini enim nostri ‘paucorum potentiam’ et 
‘popularem statum’ et ‘optimorum guber na tio nem’ dixerunt. In his letter to 
F. Picolpassi of 1438, book 8.2 (p. 137 f. Luiso), no 5, p. 208 ed. Birken­
majer, Bruni makes the same points regarding the transliteration of 
the Greek terms of constitutions. Aristotle’s ἀριστοκρατία (aristokra­
tia) Bruni translated as well as optimas (status) (ed. 1469 f. 107v = II 
9 1270b16), optimatium gubernatio (ibid. 116v/117r = III 7 1279a35) or 
shorter optimates (ibid. 110r = II 11 1273a21; ibid. 132v = IV 8 1293b36). 
It should be noted that paucorum potestas and popularis status were al­
ready used by Thomas of Aquinas in his commentary on Politics II 
6 1265b33–41, cf. Minio­Paluello 1972, p. 292—here William (p. 92.8 
ed. Susemihl) wrote oligarchia and democratia. 
 152 Cf. Bruni’s letter to F. Picolpassi of Oct. 15 1435, book 7.4 (p. 12 f. Lui­
so), no 3, p. 192 ed. Birkenmajer, and his letter to Picolpassi of 1438, 
book 8.2 (p. 137 f. Luiso), no 5, p. 202 ed. Birkenmajer. In Praemissio 
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Aristotle’s Poetics he might have chosen as an example intragodo­
tatissimus for Aristotle’s ἀτραγῳδότατος.153 Bruni’s own standards 
of a correct translation is that it ‘matches’ the Greek.154
It is difficult to determine how Bruni’s theoretical and pro­
grammatic principles of translating were actually implemented in 
his own translations of the Politics since there exists no modern 
critical edition of Bruni’s translation. The printed editions, start­
ing with the first edition of 1469 (reproductions below pp. 60–63) 
and early prints of the 15th cent. I inspected, show a great number 
of discrepancies that actually affect political terminology.155 Still, 
in spite of these problems, one can get a fair impression of his 
technique of translating. 
Bruni takes the principle of avoiding transliterations gener­
ally quite seriously: William’s yconomia156 as translation of Aris­
totle’s οἰκονομία (oikonomia) becomes disciplina rei familiaris157 
Ethicorum p. 77 ed. Baron, he applies this criticism to the translator: 
Ita semigraecus quidam et semilatinus fit, in utraque deficiens lingua, in 
neutra integer, translated by Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson IV:2, p. 213. 
Battista de’ Giudici protested against this characterization of the scho­
lastic translation of Nicomachean Ethics, s. Grabmann 1926, p. 444 n. 12, 
s. below p. 65 f.—Colucci Salutati in his letter to Pietro Corsini char­
acterizes as semigreca the translation of Plutarch’s De ira by Simon 
Attumano, in Epistolario, book VIII, no. 23, vol. II, p. 483 ed. Novati. 
 153 Minio­Paluello 1972, 51. Ibid. he quotes William’s rendering of poein for 
Aristotle’s ποιεῖν.
 154 S. Bruni’s letter to F. Picolpassi of Oct. 15 1435, book 7.4 (p. 127 f. Luiso), 
no 3, p. 189 ed. Birkenmajer: interpretatio autem omnis recta si Graeco re­
spondet, vitiosa, si non respondet. Boethius’ translations meet this stand­
ard: Textus est nitidus et planus et Graeco respondens, cf. ibid. p. 191. 
 155 Cf. III 15 1286b17, the transition from tyrannical regimes to democracy (ἐκ 
δὲ τῶν τυραννίδων εἰς δημοκρατίαν) is translated in the ed. of 1469 f. 
124v Ex tyrannis rursus ad plebem (same translation in ed. Paris 1515 f. 43v 
and 1526 f. 54r), but in the ed. Paris 1511 f. 50r Ex tyrannide rursus ad popu­
larem potentiam. Popularis status is the usual term for democracy, but just 
as Bruni can use nobiles for aristocracy (s. above n. 151) so plebs would be 
fitting for democracy. Aristotle can use demos for democracy, and Bruni 
translates demos Politics III 4 1277b3 as populus, ed. Paris 1526 f. 44v. 
 156 p. 12.3 ed. Susemihl, translation of Politics I 3 1253b12.
 157 Politics I 3 1253b12, Bruni ed. 1469 f. 90r, cf. Praefatio Oeconomicorum 
Aristotelis (of 1420), no. 10, p. 121 ed. Baron, translated by Griffiths, 
Hankins, Thompson 1987, VII:2, p. 305–306.
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or res domestica.158 William’s translation had aimed at giving the 
reader an impression even of the original semantic meaning or 
the etymology of the Greek word translated (see above p. 22). 
His practice of coining hybrid words like animalifaga, fructi faga or 
omnifaga for Greek ζῳοφάγα, καρποφάγα, or παμφάγα (s. above 
p. 21) is avoided by Bruni when he translates or rather paraphras­
es these adjectives with subordinate clauses cum alie vivis ani­
malibus· alie fructibus· alie cunctis pascuntur (ed. 1469 p. 93r). And 
William’s aequityrannum159 as translation of ἰσοτύραννον (isoty­
rannon) is rendered by Bruni with tyrannidi parem.160 Bruni is not 
bound by the principle of verbum pro verbo.
It was mentioned above (p. 22 f.) that Aristotle’s σύνταξις 
(syntaxis) became in William’s translation coordinatio (p. 91.26 
ed. Susemihl) which provides the accurate semantic equivalent 
for both parts of the Greek word whereas Bruni translated it as 
constitutio (ed. 1469 p. 102v). In the passage under consideration 
(II 6 1265b26) Aristotle classifies the specific ‘constitutional’ form 
of Plato’s Laws. Bruni’s choice constitutio has a Ciceronian ring to 
it,161 and would eventually become a crucial political term.162 
 158 Politics I 3 1253b2, Bruni ed. 1469 f. 90r.
 159 II 9 1270b13 f.; p. 123.3 ed. Susemihl.
 160 Bruni ed. 1469 f. 107v. 
 161 Cf. De Republica I 45.69 in hac iuncta moderateque permixta constitutione 
rei publicae, cf. 46.70; II 21.37. Bruni did not know this text, but he 
knew De Legibus III 5.12 Quae res cum sapientissime moderatissimeque 
constituta esset a maioribus nostris. The preceding sentence Nam sic ha­
betote, magistratibus iisque qui praesint contineri rem publicam, et ex eorum 
compositione quod cuiusque rei publicae genus sit intellegi makes clear that 
constituta refers to res publica, the idea expressed represents very much 
Aristotle’s position at Politics III 6 1278b8–10: “a constitution is the 
order of the offices and in particular of the office that rules over all 
(or “over everything”; embarrassing B. Jowett’s translation: “ … the ar­
rangement of magistracies in a state, especially of the highest of all”), 
ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς 
κυρίας πάντων, cf. IV 3 1290a7 f.
 162 H. Conring in his commentary on Lampadius’ De republica Romano­ 
Germanica gives four definitions of respublica, the second is: ordo sive 
constitutio civilis societatis, cum ratione ceterarum potestatum, tum prae­
cipue ratione eius, quae omnium est summa vel domina (Opera 2.22) which 
echoes Arist. Politics III 6 1278b8–10 (s. previous n.). Conring translates 
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Bruni who had objected to transliterations such as politia for 
Greek πολιτεία (politeia) as it was given in William, translated it 
by res publica as he had demanded in De Interpretatione. In doing 
so, Bruni followed Cicero, who took over the title of the Platonic 
dialogue Πoλιτεία (Politeia) as De re publica.163 The translation of 
Greek πολιτεία (politeia) as res publica has, however, the disadvan­
tage that res publica does not, like the Greek πολιτεία (politeia), 
have an adjective πολιτικός (politikos) or a verb πολιτεύεσθαι 
(politeuesthai) as derivatives from the stem these terms share with 
polis and politēs. The etymological connection of Greek polis, politēs, 
politeia, politikos is sacrificed both by William and Bruni. By Wil­
liam it is given up when he translated on the one hand polis by 
civitas164 and politēs by civis, but left on the other hand politeia and 
often politikos untranslated. This is by no means an obvious choice 
since medieval translations had rendered politeia by civilitas165 and 
William himself chose at times civilis as translation of politikos (s. 
above p. 19). Bruni agrees with William in translating polis by civi­
tas (when William used this Latin word instead of the transliterat­
ed politeia, see above p. 19) and politēs by civis and stays within this 
etymological pattern by choosing civilis as translation of the adjec­
tive politikos 166 as it had been done by Cicero.167 Aristotle’s statement 
simple τάξις by ordo sive constitutio. For constitutio s. W. Nippel, Misch­
verfassungstheorie und Verfassungsrealität in Antike und früher Neuzeit, 
Stuttgart 1980, 11 f. with n. 6; s. below p. 49 n. 193.
 163 Cf. On Divination II 1.3 his libris adnumerandi sunt sex de re publica, quos 
tum scripsimus …, cf. ep. ad Atticum XIII 19.4 nos in VI de re publica 
libris fecimus; De Legibus II 6.14; at I 5.15 Atticus refers with de optimo 
rei publicae statu both to Plat. Republic and Cic. De Republica, cf. ep. ad 
Quintum fratrem III 5.1.
 164 For the meaning of civitas in its legal and philosophical sense see 
Schmidt 1986, p. 305–310.
 165 S. Minio­Paluello 1972, p. 285–296. 
 166 Aristotle’s remark about man as zoon politikon by nature (ὁ ἄνθρωπος 
φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον) is in Bruni homo natura civile est animal, ed. 
1526 f. 3v.
 167 At Cic. De Republica III 3.6 illa in optimis studiis et artibus quieta vitae 
ratio is contrasted with haec civilis, i.e. the life of politics; cf. De Finibus 
IV 2.5 locum in philosophia, quem civilem recte appellaturi videmur, Graeci 
πολιτικὸν, s. Minio­Paluello 1972, p. 286 f.
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in Politics I 2 that “man is by nature an animal destined to live 
in a polis” was translated by William as homo natura civile animal 
est (p. 7.6 f. ed. Susemihl)—it is translated by Bruni in exactly the 
same words, with only the auxiliary verb est moved.168
The essential difference between the two translators consists 
in their rendering of politeia and in their translation, and under­
standing, of the “political community” (πολιτικὴ κοινωνία) which 
the polis is according to Aristotle Politics I 1. For William it is com­
municatio politica (s. above p. 16 n. 39). Communicatio is not a poor 
choice as one can see from Cicero whose communicatio sermonis 
(ep. ad Atticum I 17.6) and communicatio utilitatum (De Finibus V 
23.65) cover the areas of human social interaction addressed by 
Aristotle in Politics I 2 1253a14 ff. and ΙII 6 1278b16 ff. respec­
tively. However, William’s selection of this term seems rather in­
fluenced by the translation in the New Testament of communicatio 
for koinōnia by Jerome.169 Bruni in turn chose as translation of 
“political community” societas civilis which draws on the tradition 
of Cicero170 and Roman Law in which societas was a partnership 
entered for the purpose of some business.171 Societas civilis172 ren­
ders this aspect of Aristotelian koinōnia quite adequately since 
it is an association formed for the purpose of a certain common 
good.173 Bruni’s rendering of politeia as respublica offered to the 
reader some sort of equivalent of the Aristotelian concept. Every 
reader could associate with res publica an idea which the untrans­
lated Greek word politeia did not provide. 
 168 ed. 1526 f. 3v homo natura civile est animal. Dante had rendered this re­
mark as l’uomo è animale civile, cited by Rubinstein (1987) 2004, p. 323 
n. 40.
 169 S. Schmidt 1986, p. 299 f.
 170 Bruni could not know Cic. De Republica I 32.49 quid est enim civitas nisi 
iuris societas civium? However, he knew VI 13 concilia coetusque hominum 
iure sociati, quae civitates appellantur, cf. De Legibus I 24.62 civilis societas.
 171 S. Schmidt 1986, p. 300 f.
 172 See P. Hallberg – B. Wittrock, “From koinonìa politikè to societas civi­
lis: Birth, Disappearance and FirstRe naissan ce of the Concept,” in: 
P. Wagner (ed.), The Languages of Civil Society, New York – Oxford, 
2006, p. 28–51.
 173 Cf. Arist. Nicomachean Ethics VIII 11 1160a11–30.
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However, does not Bruni’s translation create the wrong impres­
sion as if Aristotle in his Politics had written about the Roman 
state? In De Interpretatione Bruni remarks about the property 
classes which were assessed every five years: “this property as­
sessment every five years they called ‘lustrum’; the magistrates 
which controlled the assessment were called ‘censores’” (Id quin­
quennium ‘lustrum’ appellarunt; magistratus vero, qui censui preessent, 
‘censores’ dicti sunt ; [39] p. 116). He then proceeds to give the Greek 
translation of some of these terms,174 and adds: “however, this 
fine translator had not read this, but for ‘census’ he dreamed 
up ‘honorability’, creating by himself a new word which nobody 
before had used” (sed bonus ille interpres ista non legerat. Verum pro 
censu ‘honorabilitatem’ somniavit, novum faciens verbum a se ipso, 
quod nemo ante posuerat).175 The neologism (novum faciens verbum) 
honorabilitas is due to the fact that William had not read the Latin 
texts which deal with this issue.176
This remark is part of Bruni’s criticism of William’s transla­
tion in which Greek terms were simply transcribed. However, 
with the terms lustrum and censores the reader is moved into a 
Roman environment, and this could be an objection against such 
a translation since it masks the fact that Aristotle wrote about 
the political conditions of a very different society and state. Fol­
lowing this principle, Bruni would give his translation an arti­
ficial, that is a Roman patina, and with his focus on semantic 
 174 Apud Grecos vero censores dicuntur ‘timite’ et census ‘timima’ vocatur.
 175 Ibid. [39] p. 116. Bruni translated τίμημα (timēma) e.g. Politics IV 13 
1297b2 as census, f. 70r ed. Paris 1526.
 176 Bruni was referring to Liv. I 44.1–2. The charge that the translator had 
not read the Latin authors (Cicero, Seneca, Boethius, Lactantius, and 
Jerome are listed) is found as well in Bruni, Praemissio Ethicorum p. 80 
ed. Baron, translated by Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, IV:2, 
p. 215. Cicero, Seneca, Lactantius, and Jerome appear in De studiis 
et litteris as those authors who are most highly regarded because of 
both their knowledge and their literary qualities—added are on the 
Greek side Plato, Democritus, and Aristotle, and on the Roman Varro, 
s. p. 19 ed. Baron, translated by Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, 
V:2, p. 250 f. In the letter to F. Picolpassi of 1438, book 8.2 (p. 137 f. 
Luiso), no 5, p. 208 ed. Birkenmajer, the list comprises Jerome, Cicero, 
Lactantius, Livy, Sallust, and Caesar.
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correctness present not only an interpret atio Latina, but an inter­
pretatio Romana.177 He would absorb the Greek political reality of 
the classical period and present it as if it were the Roman past. 
This was probably not felt to be a problem in the 15th century 
on the neoclassical assumption that Greece and Rome formed a 
cultural unity.178 
If the earliest printed editions of Bruni’s translation of Aris­
totle’s Politics preserve the text as Bruni wrote it, one could argue 
that, in his intention of creating a translation that does not read 
like a translated Greek text, Bruni goes too far because one conse­
quence is his decision to cut out from his translation remarks by 
Aristotle 179 which refer to the fact that for concepts he described 
there did not exist any Greek terms. We find two such remarks 
at Politics I 2 1253b9–10 and b 10–11,180 both are not rendered by 
 177 A.C. Dionisotti, “On the Greek Studies of Robert Grosseteste”, in A.C. 
Dionisotti, A. Grafton, J. Kraye (eds.), The Uses of Greek and Latin. His­
torical Essays, London 1988 (19–39), p. 34, comments similarly from the 
perspective of Grosseteste: “Leonardo Bruni’s translation of Aristotle 
into the language and thought­world of Cicero would have seemed to 
Grosseteste, I think, a betrayal, a failure to face up to the foreignness 
of the text.” 
 178 Hankins in: Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, p. 11.
 179 Schmidt 1986, p. 315 n. 77, draws attention to the fact that William 
(p. 233.11 f. ed. Susemihl) leaves out at Politics III 17 1287b38 the trans­
lation of καὶ ἄλλο βασιλικὸν (kai allo basilikon) ‘and another (form of 
right, δίκαιον, dikaion, s. below p. 53 n. 203) appropriate to kingship’ 
and “provided Ptolemy of Lucca … with a text which had a consider­
ably more republican cast than the Greek original.” Given William’s 
principle of verbum e verbo translation, this omission cannot be inten­
tional.
 180 Of the text 1253b8–12 ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ γαμική (ἀνώνυμον 
γὰρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητική (καὶ 
γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ ὠνόμασται ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι). ἔστωσαν δὴ αὗται <αἱ> 
τρεῖς ἃς εἴπομεν. ἔστι δέ τι μέρος ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι οἰκονομία  
Bruni ed. 1469 f. 90r offers only: hoc est de dominica de coniugiali de 
paterna disciplina· Est insuper quaedam pars quae videtur quibusdam esse 
disciplina rei familiaris … omitting ἀνώνυμον b9 – ὀνόματι b11 (same 
text with all omissions as well in Iuntina 1568, f. 4r). The edd. of 
Paris 1511 f. 4v, Paris 1515 f. 4v and 1526 f. 5r have: hoc est de dominica, 
de coniugiali (nam et ipsa proprio nomine non nominatur) de paterna 
re familiari· sint autem hae tres quas diximus. Est insuper … Of the 
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Bruni, at least in the Strasbourg ed. of 1469.181 The reader of his 
translation does not learn that Aristotle himself introduced con­
cepts which were new in the sense that an appropriate term for 
them did not exist. In this case in Bruni’s translation Aristotle’s 
philosophy is not presented against the background of the Greek 
knowledge or language as Aristotle wanted it to be understood. 
It is Aristotle himself who identified his place in the context of 
Greek philosophical terminology, something Bruni eliminated 
from the translation and withheld from the reader. 
Bruni seems to adhere to a form of linguistic purism to 
which not even Cicero subscribed to.182 At On Divination 1.29.60 
he writes: “see, what Socrates says in Plato’s Politeia” (Vide, quid 
Socrates in Platonis Politia loquatur). Cicero keeps Politia183 and 
does not insist on res publica which according to Bruni was the 
proper term to replace the transliterated Greek word politeia. And 
in his letter Ad Familiares 8.1.4 Cicero has Caelius saying: “Your 
political books are highly regarded by all” (tui politici libri omnibus 
two parentheses ἀνώνυμον … σύζευξις and καὶ γὰρ αὕτη … ὀνόματι 
only the second is translated but placed where the first stands in the 
Greek text.
 181 The caveat is that this omission could be due to negligence of the 
editor of the Strassburg edition of 1469. However, a common cause 
for omissions, the occurrence of the same word in close proximity 
with the effect that the text in­between was skipped, ‘haplography’ 
(Baron 1928, p. XXXI), cannot be assumed here. If Bruni left out these 
words intentionally, this is remarkable in light of his claim that his 
translation of Arist. Politics “conforms so closely to the Greek that 
nothing has been left out or added”: letter to Humphrey, the Duke 
of Gloucester, of 1437 translated by Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 
1987, II 7:2, p. 156. According to Alfonso, to reach a rhetorical effect, 
one had to make additions or leave out words, which is incompatible 
with scientific knowledge, Liber Alphonsi episcopi Burgensis, no. 2, p. 175 
ed. Birkenmajer. However, this omission at Politics I 3 does not serve a 
rhetorical purpose. For other omissions in the translation of Politics s. 
Susemihl 1872, p. XXX n. 59. Hankins 1991, vol. I, p. 47, observes that 
in his translation of Plato’s Phaedo Bruni suppresses or alters unsuit­
able material. 
 182 Cf. Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, p. 374 n. 20.
 183 As well ibid. II 27.59 Nam si ista sequimur, quod Platonis Politian nuper 
apud me mures corroserunt, de re publica debui pertimescere … 
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vigent)—Cicero’s De Republica are for his contemporaries politici 
libri—and he himself uses the expression philosophi politici.184 In 
his avoidance of Greek terms Bruni did not go so far as to call 
Aristotle’s Politics either De Republica or Libri rerum civilium but 
Libri Politicorum.185 
Bruni’s purism of the exclusive use of Latin terms in a trans­
lation as demanded in De Interpretatione is not observed strictly 
in his own translation of Aristotle’s Politics. While he objected 
in De Interpretatione to William’s transliteration of Greek words, 
in his own translation of the Politics Bruni keeps Spartan ephoria 
untranslated and presents simply the transliterated word.186 
Here and at other times he does not differ a lot from William’s 
rendering (s. below p. 75 n. 269) when he leaves Greek terms. 
Almost identical are the translations of IV 4 1292b8 ὥσπερ ἡ 
τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις (hōsper hē tyrannis en tais monarchiais) 
by William (p. 399.2 f. ed. Susemihl) sicut tyrannis in monarchiis 
and Bruni (ed. 1469 131r/v) ut enim tyrannus in monarchia, or IV 
10 1295a7 τυραννίδος δ’ εἴδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν (tyrannidos d’eidē 
dyo dieilomen) by William (p. 414.11 ed. Susemihl) tyrannidis autem 
 184 De oratore III 28.109. This expression is somehow mitigated by the fact 
that it claims to reproduce the Greek wording: a Graecis philosophi po­
litici appellati. In his letters Cicero uses a more casual style which does 
not have to meet the higher standards of his literary works; here Greek 
words, even in Greek letters, are interspersed more frequently, e.g. Ad 
Atticum II 1.8 dicit enim tamquam in Platonis πολιτείᾳ; for πολιτικός s. 
TLL, vol. X col. 2534 f. 
 185 Epistula supra translatione (sic) Politicorum Aristotelis. Ad dominum Eu­
enium Papam IV, ed. Baron p. 70, begins: Libros Politicorum … a me … 
traductos; cf. Praemissio Politicorum ed. Baron p. 74.
 186 Bruni ed. 1469 f. 107v renders διὰ ἐφορείαν II 9 1270b25 as propter epho­
riam—only ephorus is listed in TLL vol. 5, col. 660, but not ephoria or 
ephoratus (s. below p. 77, append. to II 9 1270b7). The expression τὰ 
περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν (1270b7) he translates by quae circa ephoros consti­
tuta sunt (ed. Paris 1526 f. 31r); William had written quae circa ephoriam 
(p. 122.7 f. ed. Susemihl), he differs from Bruni here (and most of the 
time in his translation of τὰ περὶ, e.g. II 2 1271a37; 4 1262b6) in leaving 
out the verb of the relative clause—as equivalent for the Greek arti­
cle τὰ (ta) that is followed by a preposition William chose the Latin 
relative pronoun, and strict adherence to the verbum e verbo principle 
might have precluded him from adding the verb in the relative clause. 
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species duas quidem divisimus and Bruni (ed. 1469 p. 134r) tyranni­
dis vero species duas ibidem distinximus. One expression is actually 
identically translated by William and Bruni: III 14 1285a16 f. ἄλλο 
μοναρχίας εἶδος (allo monarchias eidos) is in William (p. 215.1 f. 
ed. Susemihl) alia monarchiae species, in Bruni ed. 1469 p. 123r 
alia … monarchiae species—it should be noted that monarchia is 
not used in classical Latin.187 Close are William’s translation of 
III 13 1284a26 τοὺς ψέγοντας τὴν τυραννίδα (tous psegontas tēn 
tyrannida) as vituperantes tyrannidem (p. 209.6 f. ed. Susemihl) 
and Bruni’s qui vituperant tyrannidem (ed. 1469 p. 122r). Of the 
constitutional terms which William simply transliterated Bruni 
in De Interpretatione ([43] p. 120) lists only oligarchia, democratia 
and aristocratia, not tyrannis which was after all used in classical 
Latin188—in using words taken over from Greek that had become 
accepted in Latin Bruni follows Cicero’s practice.189
In other, admittedly rare, cases, Bruni actually transliter­
ates a Greek term when William tried to find a Latin equiva­
lent, e.g. in the case of the Athenian institution of ostrakismos 
which becomes in Bruni ostratismus when William had chosen 
relegatio, relegare.190 It is understandable that Bruni did not trans­
late the names of certain musical instruments at Politics VIII 6 
1341a40–b1 like πηκτίδες (Bruni pectates) or βάρβιτοι (Bruni bar­
biti), however, he left as well ἑπτάγωνα καὶ τρίγωνα as heptago­
na et trigona. It seems that in De Interpretatione Bruni considered 
 187 monarchia is used by Tert.; Lact., cf. TLL vol. 8, col. 1400.
 188 On tyrannus s. Aug. De civitate Dei II 21 Cum vero iniustus est rex, quem 
tyrannum more Graeco appellavit (scil. Cicero). For tyrannis s. Liv. 
XXXV 12.7.
 189 According to Cic. Academica I 7.25 f. (cited above p. 17 n. 42) a number 
of Greek words could be expressed in Latin, however, one uses the 
Greek term like philosophia, rhetorica, dialectica, following a long es­
tablished practice. However, Cic. is reluctant to take over Greek words 
that aren’t established yet, cf. On Divination II 53.108 Sed demus tibi 
istas duas sumptiones (ea quae λήμματα appellant dialectici, sed nos latine 
loqui malumus). Similarly Bruni avoids using oeconomica or politica 
since nos, ut opinor, nostris vocabulis uti magis decet, quam alienis, Prae­
fatio Oeconomicorum Aristotelis (of 1420), no. 10, p. 121 ed. Baron.
 190 Bruni ed. 1469 f. 123v, translation of Arist. Politics III 13 1284a17 ff. (s. 
below p. 77, appendix); William p. 208.9; 209.2; 211.11 ed. Susemihl.
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such transliterations as the lesser evil when he points out that he 
would condone transliteration in the case of a few very unusual 
and remote (admodum peregrinis et reconditis) words if they cannot 
be easily translated into Latin ([43] p. 120). 
On the other hand, in doing so he avoided the impression 
that Aristotle’s Politics was a work that analyzed conditions of 
the Roman past, and by retaining e.g. tyrannis191 he revealed that 
this constitutional form belongs to the world of the Greeks, and 
this was the more justified since Aristotle in III 14 had placed 
the various kinds of tyranny he distinguishes into their specific 
geographical and historical context.192 
I referred earlier (p. 26) to the fact that Nicole Oresme intro­
duced into the French language more than 1000 words, among 
them the word “politique”. With his choice of Latin res publi­
ca, which was to replace the transliteration of Greek politeia, 
Bruni was influential since now res publica, or expanded status or 
constitutio rei publicae prevailed over Greek politeia.193 Ludovicus 
Valentina replaced in his edition of Thomas of Aquinas’ com­
mentary of Aristotle Politics (1492) politia by res publica.194
 The larger context in which this term was used merits a clos­
er examination. James Hankins (2005) has discussed the changes 
the word respublica underwent during the 15th cent. from the scho­
lastic meaning to the sense it received during the later Renais­
sance. Starting with antiquity, he draws attention to the fact that 
in Aristotle politeia (πολιτεία) is used both in a generic meaning, 
including all forms of government, and a specific one, referring 
 191 Bruni ed. 1469 f. 122r (= III 13 1284a26), s. above n. 188. Tyrannicus is 
used by Cic. De Legibus I 15.42.
 192 1285a17: “among some barbarians”; a30: “among the Greeks of old.”
 193 Constitutio became in English constitution, cf. Grimm, in Brunner et al. 
(eds.) 2004, p. 865 f. (in German Verfassung). Greek politeia as political 
order lost relevance when it assumed the designation for the institu­
tion of public order, the police, German Polizei, cf. F.­L. Knemeyer, art. 
“Polizei”, in Brunner et al. (eds.) 2004, vol. 5, p. 875–897.
 194 Mager in Brunner et al. (eds.) 2004, vol. 5, p. 566. cf. ibid. p. 567: “Die 
Belege für die seit Leonardo Brunis Übersetzung von Aristoteles’ 
“Politik” gängig gewordene Verwendung von ‘res publica’ im Sinne 
von ‘politia’ sind seit dem 15. Jahrhundert Legion.”
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to a form of government that is based on hoplites (or, one might 
add: a mixed constitution combining elements of democracy and 
oligarchy). In Latin, Hankins distinguishes as meanings of respu­
blica “public affairs”, “public good”, “the state” or in a pregnant 
sense a “free state” as opposed to tyranny. He points out that 
in Cicero respublica carries moral connotations since under the 
government of a respublica the powerful should exercise restraint, 
place the common good over self­interest and share power in­
stead of aspiring to unrestrained dominance. He states that the 
Greek word politeia by comparison “is much more value­neutral 
and analytical” and contrasts this with Latin respublica: “to call a 
state a respublica implies that it is a good form of government as 
opposed to a tyranny or a government in which private interests 
prevail over the common good” (p. 489 f.). In scholastic philoso­
phy, respublica is never used to refer to non­monarchical regimes 
whereas in the second half of the 15th century respublica was in­
creasingly used to stand for ‘non­monarchical regime’.195 Hankins 
does not assign a role to Bruni “in the appropriation of the word 
respublica by non­monarchical regimes” (p. 492).196 He dates the 
 195 Hankins 2005, p. 493. Among pre­humanistic writers there were (with 
a few exceptions) “no signs of the later disposition to use the term 
res publica to distinguish such elective forms of government from he­
reditary monarchies.” One cannot find either Cicero’s notion that such 
elective regimes were “the only forms of res publica truly worthy of the 
name,” Q. Skinner, “The vocabulary of Renaissance Republicanism: 
A Cultural longue­durée?”, in: A. Brown (ed.), Language and images of 
Renaissance Italy, Oxford 1995 (87–110), 101. Cf. Mornhaupt, art. “Ver­
fassung I”, in Brunner et al. (eds.) 2004, vol. 6, p. 831–862.
 196 Hankins 2005, bases his observations on Bruni’s literary works and 
part of his correspondence. His statement: Bruni “prefers popularis sta­
tus or popularis forma as the equivalent of politeia in the specific sense” 
(p. 492) is, however, not always correct for Bruni’s translation of the 
Politics. In the taxonomy of constitutions in III 7 1279a38 f. he trans­
lates politeia in the specific sense as respublica: καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν 
ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία: vocatur communi nomine om­
nium rerum publicarum, respublica (ed. Paris 1526 f. 43v), similarly his 
translation of IV 7 1293a40 ed. Paris 1526 f. 63v. Popularis status is the 
term for democracy in III 7 1279b6 where he translates the degenera­
tion of politeiai in the specific sense into democracies by: ex republica 
autem in popularem statum, ed. Paris 1526 f. 43v, s. above p. 39 n. 151. 
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use of respublica in the generic meaning197 to the second half of 
the fifteenth century, when it began “to stand for ‘non­monarchi­
cal regime’” (p. 493), but considers that it might go back to the 
beginning of the century as evidenced by Vergerio’s treatise De 
Republica Veneta of 1400/03 (p. 494). Hankins suggests that this 
development could be due to the recovery of Tacitus for whom 
the respublica was a period characterized by freedom, an under­
standing of respublica Hankins finds in Bruni’s periodization of 
Roman history (p. 493). With regard to Aristotle, Hankins argues 
that “the ‘Aristotelian sense’ of republic” continued to be used by 
monarchical writers, but was challenged by the ‘Machiavellian 
sense’, “for it was surely Machiavelli’s authority that was respon­
sible for the triumph of the new, Renaissance meaning of respub­
lica as equivalent to ‘non­monarchical regime’” (p. 498). 
Hankins’ concern is not ancient Greek political terminology 
but the question whether the republican ideals, the qualities of 
prudence, character, education, and civic values such as loyalty, 
love of the country, and devotion to the common good originate 
in Renaissance republics and were defined against the threat of 
tyrants in Italy, but later copied by monarchical regimes and non­
republican ideology. Hankins dismisses this theory, which had 
been set forth by Hans Baron and others, by pointing out that 
monarchists like Vergerio espoused the same qualities. He argues 
that ‘monarchical’ or ‘signorial’ humanists shared the same values, 
however, they differed mainly in their understanding of freedom 
and equality (p. 504). Against this commonality, “the ideological 
use of respublica in the specific sense” (Hankins 2005, p. 498) is a 
new development, possibly influenced by a tradition going back to 
Cicero or Tacitus. Hankins speaks of a “relatively late emergence 
of the modern usages of the word respublica” (p. 500). 
For the inconsistency in Bruni’s usage s. N. Rubinstein, “Florentine 
Constitutionalism and Medici Ascendancy in the fifteenth century,” 
in N. Rubinstein (ed.), Studies in Italian history in the Middle Ages and 
the Renaissance, Evanston 1968 (442–462), 447 n. 3. 
 197 It is, however, not “the best constitution for most cities” (Hankins 
2005, p. 293). This constitution is discussed at Arist. Politics IV 11, but 
not called a politeia.
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It seems to me that the Greek tradition has been ignored here. 
While it is true that at Politics III 6–7 the two monarchical re­
gimes, kingship and tyranny, are listed among the politeiai (πο­
λιτεῖαι), and one could argue that Aristotle indeed espouses a 
concept of regimes that is “much more value­neutral”, and not 
“freighted with positive moral connotations” (Hankins 2005, 
p. 489) these chapters are by no means representative for Aris­
totle’s constitutional theory; books IV–VI offer much more nu­
anced explanations. There Aristotle distinguishes or contrasts 
politeia on the one hand and monarchy, that is tyranny and/
or kingship, on the other,198 and he denies a radical, anarchic 
democracy the qualification to count as a politeia.199 According 
to Politics IV the best constitutions represent the middle from 
which there are deviation forms in two opposite directions: 200 
the regimes of the masses, on the one hand, and those of a 
few or one, on the other, are no longer politeiai when they are 
not governed by laws.201 Among the forms of rule, Aristotle dis­
tinguishes already in Politics I202 one that is exercised among 
 198 IV 2 1289b2 f. ὥστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρίστην οὖσαν πλεῖστον ἀπέ­
χειν πολιτείας, similarly 8 1293b27 ff. For the distinction of politeiai 
(πολιτεῖαι) and monarchies cf. V 10 1310b1; 1311a24; b 37 ὥσπερ καὶ 
περὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰς μοναρχίας; 12 1315b40, cf. III 15 1286b13 
(cf. Schütrumpf, Aristoteles Politik 1991, vol. 2, p. 554 f., n. on 1286b12; 
p. 342 n. on II 10 1272b2; p. 466 n. on III 7 1279a37. The title of Raffaele 
Lippo Brandolini’s treatise De comparatione regni et reipublicae (cited by 
Hankins 2005, p. 497; written ca. 1490) could reflect Aristotelian ter­
minology as introduced into Latin by Bruni’s translation. 
 199 IV 4 1292a10–32; cf. VII 4 1326b3–7. For Cic. a corrupt state retains 
only the word res publica, but has lost it in truth, De Republica V 1.2 rem 
publicam verbo retinemus, re ipsa vero iam pridem amisimus. Bruni did not 
know Cic.’s De Republica I–V, but he could be familiar with Aug. De 
civitate Dei II 21 where the result of the same conditions is described 
as non iam vitiosam, sicut pridie fuerat disputatum, sed, sicut ratio ex illis 
definitionibus conexa docuisset, omnino nullam esse rem publicam.
 200 IV 3 1290a24–29.
 201 For democracy see above p. 39 n. 151; p. 155 and 50 n. 196. A radical 
oligarchy that no longer follows laws is the equivalent of tyranny and 
is given the name dynasteia: IV 5 1292b5–10.
 202 I 12 1259b1 ff. At Eudemian Ethics VII 10 1242b22–31 Aristotle distinguishes 
the rule among citizens (politikē) from one that is exercised by a king.
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citizens fashion (πολιτικῶς, politikōs) from that of a king (βασι­
λικῶς, basilikōs).203 
When Bruni in his letter to the Emperor Sigismund of De­
cember 1413 explained the political system of Florence, he ab­
solves this task by outlining the complete system of six consti­
tutions in a way which reminds of Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 
VIII 12 (1160a31 ff.), and by placing Florence’s political system 
into this framework, referring to its institutions, the character 
of its constitution as status popularis, the working of the govern­
ment with term limits for some of its officials, the role of law and 
justice, the liberty and equality its citizens enjoyed,204 he echoes 
fundamental concepts of Aristotle’s Politics. After all, Aristotle 
builds his political theory not around the statesman (πολιτικός, 
politikos) but the city and its ‘parts’, the citizens (III 1).205 
The political rule is exercised over citizens who are free and 
equal206 and who do no longer tolerate the rule of one man. The 
passage Politics III 15207 where Aristotle makes this point is trans­
lated by Bruni: non amplius toleraverunt regem, sed commune quid­
dam quaerentes, respublicas constituere.208 As translator of Aristotle, 
Bruni is familiar with the contrast of monarch (rex) and respublica 
as forms of government that are opposed to one another not sim­
ply in terms of competing ideologies, but of the reaction of the 
people who are unwilling to put up with the rule of one man. It 
should be stressed here that the contrast of monarch (rex) and 
respublica, which is in Aristotle only implied is actually created 
in Bruni’s translation because he added the object regem, king, to 
the verb ‘tolerated’ which in the Greek text is used without an ob­
ject. Clearly he did justice to the sense of the Aristotelian passage 
 203 At Politics III 17 1287b38 f. Aristotle distinguishes a different form of 
‘right’ (δίκαιον) appropriate to kingship and one appropriate to a 
community governed by citizens, cf. above p. 45 n. 179. 
 204 The text in Baron 21968, p. 181–184; on the authorship and date ibid. 
173–181; Rubinstein (1987) 2004, p. 325. 
 205 S. Schűtrumpf, Aristoteles Politik Buch I, vol. 1, 1991, p. 180–182.
 206 Arist. Politics III 4 1277b7 f.
 207 Arist. Politics III 15 1286b5–13; οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον ἀλλ’ ἐζήτουν κοινόν 
τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν (b 11–13).
 208 Ed. Paris 1526 f. 54r.
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but brought in almost a rhetorical fashion to the foreground the 
contrast of rex and respublica as regimes that are incompatible 
with one another. In his translation the resistance of the subjects 
who will establish a politeia is not pointed against the political 
system or their own lack of political rights as the Greek could be 
understood but against the king. One might add that other Greek 
authors of the 4th cent. BC used the same contrast of politeia and 
monarchy or tyranny.209
Therefore, the meaning of respublica that became prevalent 
at the end of the 15th cent. could be considered good classical use 
and might well owe its existence to the classical Greek texts that 
were studied so intensively during that period. There is a further 
argument supporting this view, and that is the fact that, accord­
ing to Hankins (2005, p. 494), the lexical opposite of respublica 
is not only tyrannia but “studium partis (factionalism)” as well. 
This contrast can be found in Plato’s Laws VIII 832c, where the 
Greek philosopher denies that the regimes of democracy, oligar­
chy, and tyranny are constitutions (πολιτεῖαι, politeiai), since they 
should be most fittingly be called ‘states of factions’ (στασιωτεῖαι, 
stasiōteiai). 
If it is correct that the political terminology used in the second 
half of the 15th cent. follows, or is at least consistent with, that of 
Greek texts of the 4th cent. BC, then one should not contrast, with 
Hankins (2005, p. 498), an “older understanding (which I would 
like to christen the ‘Aristotelian sense’ of republic)” with the 
“‘Machiavellian sense’”, that is “the new, Renaissance meaning 
of respublica as equivalent to ‘non­monarchical regime’”. On the 
 209 Isocrates or. 4.125: “in earlier times the Spartans used to remove ty­
rants and help the people, but now … they fight against constitutional 
governments while they set up monarchies” (καὶ πρότερον μὲν τοὺς 
<μὲν> τυράννους ἐξέβαλλον, τῷ δὲ πλήθει τὰς βοηθείας ἐποιοῦν­
το, νῦν δὲ … ταῖς μὲν πολιτείαις πολεμοῦσιν, τὰς δὲ μοναρχίας 
συγκαθιστᾶσιν); cf. ep. 4.6; 6.11; Xenophon Hellenika VI 3.8: “you 
Spartans seem to enjoy tyrannical regimes more than constitutional 
governments” (ἐοίκατε τυραννίσι μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτείαις ἡδόμενοι); 
Demosthenes or. 1.5: “generally a tyrannical regime is in my opinion 
not a trustworthy thing for polities” (καὶ ὅλως ἄπιστον, οἶμαι, ταῖς 
πολιτείαις ἡ τυραννίς).
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other hand, if the contrast of republics and monarchical regimes, 
including tyrannies, does reflect the distinction made by 4th cent. 
BC philosophers and orators between politeiai (πολιτεῖαι) and re­
gimes like tyranny or radical democracies that do not deserve to 
be included among politeiai (πολιτεῖαι), this view of the tradition 
could support Hankin’s argument that it did not need Renais­
sance republics in their fight for freedom to formulate these con­
cepts. One finds this concept expressed in Bruni’s translation 
of Politics IV 4, a section (1292a10–32) which argues that radi­
cal democracy is analogous to “tyranny among monarchies” and 
ends with the statement that cites with approval someone who 
declares such a democracy is not a politeia (πολιτεία): “rightly 
seem those to voice their blame who say that a government of 
this kind is democratic, but not a form of republic. For where 
laws cannot prevail there is no republic” (Merito igitur reprehendere 
videntur qui dicunt huiusmodi popularem esse potentiam, non autem 
reipublicae speciem. ubi enim leges dominari non praevalent non est 
respublica, ed. 1526 p. 61r). Bruni’s translation of Aristotle’s Politics 
should be included among those texts that shaped the notion of 
respublica as a form of government that is opposed to monarchy. 
This is, however, only one side of the coin. Aristotle argues in 
Politics III 17 that under certain, rare conditions the absolute rule 
of one man would be the appropriate form of government and the 
only option is that all others obey such a man (1288a28 πείθεσθαι 
τῷ τοιούτῳ, peithesthai tōi toioutōi). This is translated by Bruni ut 
huic suadenti pareatur (ed. 1469 p. 126v)—suadenti is Bruni’s addi­
tion and makes the absolute rule of this one man look more be­
nevolent. Instead of giving advice (suadere), he could give orders 
or take actions (of the kind Plato mentions in Politicus 293d).
In a review of the translation of Plato’s Republic by K. Preisen­
danz (1909),210 O. Weinreich touched briefly on the beginnings of 
translations of Greek philosophical texts into Latin. He referred 
to the role Petrarch played in turning the philosophical interest 
 210 O. Weinreich, Ausgewählte Schriften I (1907–1921), ed. K. Wille, vol. 1, 
Amsterdam 1969, 12–15, review of K. Preisendanz, Platons Staat. Ins 
Deutsche übertragen, Jena 1909.
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away from Aristotle to Plato. Weinreich refers to the translations 
of Plato into Latin down to the masterwork by Ficino and argues 
that at that time the controversy over the rank of Plato or Aristo­
tle respectively was settled: “Plato prevailed.”211 This reflects the 
outdated view according to which during the Middle Ages Aris­
totle was the dominant philosopher whereas in the Renaissance 
he was dethroned by Plato. James Hankins has countered that 
the Renaissance “might with perfect justice be styled … an Age of 
Aristotle”, and he singles out Bruni as “the first and in some ways 
the most characteristic member of this tradition of humanistic 
Aristotelianism.”212 
 Petrarch’s attack against Aristotle reached its climax in his 
De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia 213 of 1367. This work contains 
not only a harsh criticism of Aristotle, but of the ignorant crowd 
that follows him blindly and rejects angrily any objection against 
him. Petrarch possesses the courage to undertake this criticism. 
In his critical comments on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics he 
concedes that Aristotle defined virtue with great acumen. After 
having learned this from him, he had now a better knowledge of 
virtue than previously, however, he did not change: “unchanged 
is the mind as it was, the desire is unchanged, unchanged am I” 
(idem est animus qui fuerat, voluntasque eadem, idem ego).214 To know 
is one thing, to desire is a different issue. For Petrarch, Aristotle 
succeeded in teaching what virtue is, however he failed to win 
over one’s heart because Aristotle lacked the diction needed to 
 211 “Platon siegte”, Weinreich (s. previous n.) p. 13, cf. Baron 1928, p. XXVI: 
“Siegeszug des Platonismus.” However, the fact that Bruni’s transla­
tions of Plato were replaced by those of Ficino does not affect the 
success of Bruni’s translations of Aristotle, s. below p. 59; 64.
 212 In: Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, p. 259 f., cf. id. 2003, p. 186. 
 213 Ed. by E. Fenzi 1999.
 214 Petrarch, De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia p. 266 ed. Fenzi: idem est 
animus qui fuerat, voluntasque eadem, idem ego. Aliud est enim scire atque 
aliud amare, aliud intellegere atque aliud velle. Docet ille, non infi ti or, 
quid est virtus; at stimulos ac verborum faces, quibus ad amorem virtutis 
vitii que odium mens urgetur atque incenditur, lectio illa vel non habet, vel 
paucissimos ha bet. Quos qui querit, apud nostros, precipue Ciceronem atque 
Anneum inveniet …
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instill desire for the good and resentment of what is bad. This, 
Petrarch continues, one finds in Cicero and Seneca. While in 
his ethical views Petrarch is to a certain degree influenced by 
Augustine,215 in his account of how one should win over a person 
he shows the influence of Cicero. According to the Brutus one of 
the three goals to be accomplished by rhetoric is that the listener 
be moved rather deeply, moveri vehementius,216 something Aristotle 
did not accomplish as Petrarch claims. Petrarch’s criticism of 
Aristotle’s ethical writings reminds us of Cicero’s criticism of 
the Stoics when they write on the same subject: “What? Could a 
Stoic arouse enthusiasm? He will rather immediately drown any 
enthusiasm if he received someone full of zeal.”217
Bruni did not share this negative judgment of Aristotle. In 
his work Vita Aristotelis of 1429218 he contrasts the views held by 
Plato and Aristotle respectively and voices his dismay over some 
of the regulations proposed by Plato in the Republic, such as the 
arrangement that women belong to all or that owning any posses­
sions is prohibited, since all this is at odds with present custom.219 
Apart from arguments on the content of the Republic, Bruni gives 
a thorough explanation of the high quality of the style, that is the 
rhetorical style, of the works of Aristotle.220 He admits that cer­
tain learned men who do not know Greek would refuse to believe 
him.221 Those who know Aristotle only from his translations lack 
 215 Fenzi ibid. n. 452, p. 451–453.
 216 Cic. Brutus 185: Tria sunt enim … quae sint efficienda dicendo: ut doceatur 
is, apud quem dicetur, ut delectetur, ut moveatur vehementius; De optimo ge­
nere oratorum 1.3: Optimus est enim orator qui dicendo animos audientium 
et docet et delectat et permovet.
 217 De Finibus IV 3.7: Quid? Ille incendat? Restinguet citius, si ardentem 
acceperit.
 218 Partly reprinted in Baron 1928, p. 41–49. For the date s. ibid. p. 174.
 219 ab hoc nostro usu consuetudineque vivendi plurimum abhorrent, p. 45 
ed. Baron, translated by Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, VI:3, 
p. 289. The same argument is found in Bruni’s letter, book 9.5(4) to 
Niccolò Ceva of 1441 (Luiso p. 150 f.). Bruni echoes Cic. De oratore I 
52.224.
 220 Cf. Botley 2004, p. 42–62.
 221 Bruni, Vita Aristotelis p. 46 ed. Baron: apud quosdam doctos viros, Grae­
carum tamen litterarum ignaros, fidem non fieri. Bruni had reason to insist 
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what is needed in order to appreciate his style. If Aristotle were 
still alive, he would have denied that he wrote these works which 
circulated under his name.222 He was the most polished author. If 
someone would not believe him, Bruni, he should believe Cicero. 
Differently than in the argument put forward by Petrarch, Cicero 
is no longer the author with perfect style—in contrast with Aris­
totle who, for Petrarch, is incapable of moving the reader—but 
Cicero is now the key witness for the rhetorical quality of the 
very same Aristotle.223 
Nine years later Bruni completed his translation of the Poli­
tics. In one of the two preserved prefaces he states that the reason 
for this undertaking was the same as in the case of the earlier 
translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, that is the recognition that 
Greek works written in the most elegant style were reduced by 
the incompetence of a bad translator to ridiculous ineptitude.224 
Bruni is now able to refer to the success of his translation of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Its usefulness is proven by the fact that truly 
educated men embraced these books. The effect of his trans­
lation was that the understanding of these issues received the 
highest elucidation.225
on this issue at a different occasion, namely when Alfonso of Cartagena, 
who did not know Greek, attacked his translation of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, cf. Bruni’s letter to F. Picolpassi of 1438, book 8.2 (p. 137 f. Luiso), 
no 5, p. 194 Birkenmajer, cf. p. 201, cf. 202: Quaero num Graece sciat? “non 
scio, inquit …” and: qui Graecarum litterarum penitus est ignarus, itaque 
neque vim verbi neque testimonium scriptorum in ea lingua capere potest. 
 222 He repeats this idea in De Interpretatione [45] p. 122, cf. Dialogus p. 58 
ed. Garin: Aristotle would not recognize from the translation that 
these were his works. 
 223 Vita Aristotelis p. 46 ed. Baron Ille (i.e. Aristoteles) enim politissimus scrip­
tor esse voluit et, quod voluit, curavit et, quod curavit, asse cutus est. Verum, 
quia verba fidem non faciunt mea, Marci Tullii accedat auctoritas. Cui 
enim hi de eloquentia iudicanti credent, si Marci Tullii iudicio non credent? 
Cf. Dialogus p. 58 ed. Garin; Praemissio Ethicorum p. 77 ed. Baron.
 224 Bruni, Praemissio Politicorum p. 73 f. ed. Baron: Nam cum viderem hos 
Aristotelis libros, qui apud Graecos elegantissimo stilo perscripti sunt, vi­
tio mali interpretis ad ridiculam quamdam inep ti tu di nem esse redactos …, 
translated in: Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, II 7:VI, p. 163.
 225 Ibid. p. 74: ita postmodum eos libros complexi sunt, ut in maximam lucem 
illarum rerum cognitio sit perducta.
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Bruni claims that he advanced the understanding (cognitio) of the 
matters discussed in the Nicomachean Ethics—this is a much more 
modest claim than the objective pursued by Petrarch, namely that 
an ethical treatise of a philosopher change the life of his reader. 
Bruni is satisfied with having clarified the argument and having 
furthered the understanding (cognitio) of this Aristotelian work.226 
Bruni might here echo Cicero, who viewed a translation based 
on its impact on the knowledge (cognitio) of the citizens—Cicero 
was talking of a translation of Plato and Aristotle,227 the very issue 
Bruni dealt with in his reply to Petrarch.
Bruni referred to the success of his translation of the Nico­
machean Ethics.228 The number of manuscript copies and early 
printed editions of Bruni’s translation of this work, of the Oeco­
nomica, and the Politics229 proves its popularity. In the late 15th 
cent. Bruni’s translation of the Politics replaced that of William 
 226 Hankins 2006b, p. 136.
 227 De Finibus I 3.7, cited above p. 31 n. 113. For removing obscurity s. above 
p. 29 n. 99 and 100.
 228 Letter to F. Picolpassi of Oct. 15 1435, book 7.4 (p. 127 f. Luiso), no 3, 
p. 187 ed. Birkenmajer, about his translation of the Nicomachean Ethics: 
quam, simul atque edita est, sic arripuerunt homines, ut momento paene 
temporis non solum Italia voluminibus eius repleta sit, verum etiam ad ex­
tremas terrarum oras convolarit, ut publica iam lectione studiorum celebre­
tur. Battista de’ Giudici confirms this when he explains how difficult it 
would be to criticize Bruni because of the great number of people who 
follow his authority on account of the rhetoric found in his transla­
tion, cited in Grabmann 1926, p. 444 n. 11. 
 229 Bruni’s translation of the Nicomachean Ethics survives in 285 manu­
scripts and 31 editions, of the Oeconomica in 260 manuscripts and 
55 editions, and of the Politics in 206 manuscripts and 51 editions, 
Hankins 2003, p. 191.—Bruni’s translation of the Politics received dis­
tinguished place in the history of scholarship. The edition Ethica, 
Politica, Oeconomica, Leonardo Aretino interprete, Strasbourg (Jo­
hann Metelin) before 10.4. 1469, is according to L.W. Riley, Aristotle. 
Texts and commentaries to 1700 in the University of Pennsylvania Li­
brary, Philadelphia 1961, p. 33, the “first printed edition of Aristotle.” 
I inspected copies at the Staatsbibliothek Berlin and the Beineke 
library at Yale University, New Haven. It has been digitalized by the 
Münchener DigitalisierungsZentrum, call number BSB­Ink A­685 – 
GW 2367.
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1  Aristotelis Ethica ad Nicomachum; Politica et Oeconomica Leonardo Aretino 
interprete, Strasbourg ap. Johann Mentelin (before April 10) 1469, f. 89 v, 
translation of Pol. 1.1 1252a1­a5
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2  Aristotelis Ethica …, f. 90 r, translation of Pol. 1.1 1252a5­b14
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3  Aristotelis Ethica …f. 103 v, translation of Pol. 2.6 1265b4­b41
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4  Aristotelis Ethica …f. 104 r, translation of Pol. 2.6 1265b41­7 1266a38
64 Eckart  Schütrumpf
of Moerbeke in the commentary to the Politics by Thomas of 
Aquinas.230 His commentary continued to draw the attention of 
theologians and philosophers, but the Latin translation of Aris­
totle’s Politics on which it was based and to which Thomas of 
Aquinas owed his knowledge of this Aristotelian text was sub­
stituted at the end of the fifteenth century by the translation 
of Bruni. The same happened with the Latin translation of the 
Nicomachean Ethics.231 Bruni’s translation of Aristotle’s Politics 
“was the most popular translation of that text until well into 
the sixteenth century, and was used as a basis of commentaries 
by Donato Acciaiuoli, Lefèvre d’Étaples, Octavianus Ferrarius, 
Melanchthon and probably others.”232 In the Iuntina edition of 
Thomas of Aquinas’ commentary of Aristotle’s Politics (Venice 
1568), in which the translation of Wilhelm of Moerbeke had been 
replaced by that of L. Bruni, the editor Iulius Martianus Rota 
adds separately “the old translation of the Politics (antiquam Po­
liticorum interpretationem), without giving the name of the trans­
lator, justifying this enterprise “in order to protect this book, 
whatever its quality might be, against destruction” (quo liber iste 
qualiscumque, ab interitu vindicaretur, p. 133v). By then the survival 
of William’s translation must have been in jeopardy. Rota ex­
plains that he provided the opportunity to read this translation 
for “whoever is an enthusiast of antiquity” (quisquis antiquitatis 
amator extiterit). Rota forestalls criticism that a reader could be 
offended by William’s translation (nec si quid offendet, quod se re­
moretur, nos culpet). Now his translation was of interest only to 
lovers of ancient things and textual critics (s. above p. 16 n. 37). 
 230 Schmitt 1983, p. 20. There were “at least five” printed editions of St. 
Thomas’ commentary of the Politics together with Bruni’s translation: 
Hankins in: Griffiths, Hankins, Thompson 1987, 355 n. 167. 
 231 S. Hankins 2003, p. 182 f. with n.14.
 232 Hankins 2003, p. 182 f. Acciaiuoli 1429–1478; Lefèvre d’Étaples ca. 1455–
1536; Octavianus Ferrarius ca. 1465–1517; Melanchthon 1497–1560. 
Bruni’s translation in turn was replaced by those of Pier Vettori (1499–
1585) and Denys Lambin (1520–1572): Hankins in Griffiths, Hankins, 
Thompson 1987, p. 355 n. 170. For the Latin translations of Aristotle s. 
Keßler 1995, p. X–XXV.
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6 . t H e  c o n t r o v e r s y  o v e r  b r u n i ’ s  t r a n s l at i o n — 
c o n t e m p o r a r y  a n d  m o d e r n
Bruni’s translation uses the classical Latin vocabulary and fol­
lows the order and structure of classical Latin according to the 
model of Cicero that was shared by other translators of the 16th 
cent. Some went further than Bruni had done. Joachim Périon 
(1499–1559), for instance, produced translations233 that aspired 
to elegance, but lacked precision to such a degree that at times 
they bordered on paraphrases. Already in the 16th cent. a reac­
tion against this tendency set in. And today Périon is criticized 
for this approach. Charles Schmitt argued that Périon, misled 
by Cicero’s characterization of Aristotle’s style as flumen orationis 
aureum, “a golden stream of speech,” put the poorly written Greek 
of Aristotle’s text “into refined Ciceronian Latin”, not seeing the 
difference between a philosophical text that aims at truth and a 
rhetorical style.234 This seems a new version of the controversy 
over the merit of Bruni’s translation in comparison with that of 
William of Moerbeke which took place already during Bruni’s 
lifetime. 
Battista de’ Giudici († 1484) acknowledged the eloquence of 
Bruni’s translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, but claimed that 
Bruni lacked the training needed to translate a philosophical text, 
proven by the fact that he was ignorant of the distinction between 
 233 Joachimus Perion, Aristotelis ad Nicomachum filium de moribus, quae Ethi ca 
nominantur, libri 10, per Nicolaum Grouchium [de Grouchy] corr. & 
em., Paris 1555. S. Keßler 1995, p. XIII f.
 234 Schmitt 1983, p. 73: “perhaps bewitched, as had been Bruni and others 
before him, by Cicero’s description of Aristotle as flumen orationis 
aureum and by Quintilian’s eloquendi suavitas, Périon took it upon 
himself to render these characterizations true by putting the crabbed 
and often corrupt Greek of the existing corpus Aristotelicum into re­
fined Ciceronian Latin. In doing so not only did he fail to realize that 
philosophical and scientific writings, aiming as they do at truth, have 
more at stake than the polished verbiage of the rhetor …” 
66 Eckart  Schütrumpf
contrarius and contradictorius, and fell short of philosophical truth. 
For that reason he was inferior to the older translator who “more 
zealous for philosophical truth did not wish to speak so ornately, 
lest he fall into the errors in which that one (Bruni) lapsed.”235 
This remark is in line with with Boethius’ principle that works in 
which understanding of things is sought, the uncorrupted truth 
and not the charm of a lucid style must be expressed.236
Alfonso of Cartagena (1384–1456), later bishop of Burgos 
(Castille), advanced similar arguments.237 He associated philo­
sophical knowledge (scientia) with a Latin language that is pre­
cise, used in its most correct sense, and fitting the simplicity of 
the issues discussed.238 Helene Harth239 has shown how Alfonso’s 
views on translation were founded on the scholastic concept of 
a universal grammar, whose rational structure is determined 
by modi significandi, modes of meaning, that are based on modi 
essendi, modes of being, which are perceived by modi intellegendi, 
modes of understanding. With this approach, the goal is to ex­
press in translation the truth of the argument without caring 
about the semantic and stylistic specifics of the source. The truth 
that is found in Aristotle can be judged without knowledge of 
the language the author wrote in. For Bruni, on the other hand, 
there existed no absolute truth of reason, but ideas of a specific 
author who wrote in a specific historical and cultural context in a 
language that is shaped by the literary tradition and conventions 
of the people to whom the philosopher belonged.240 Alfonso’s 
views on translation follow the tradition of the notion of the fidus 
 235 Antiquus interpres magis studens philosophice veritati non ideo ornate dicere 
voluit, ne in errores in quos iste lapsus est incideret, cited by Grabmann 
1926, p. 444 n. 12, translation after Seigel 1968, p. 122 f.
 236 In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta, CSEL vol. 48, 1906, p. 135 in his scriptis 
in quibus rerum cognitio queritur, non luculentae orationis lepos, sed incor­
rupta veritas exprimenda est. 
 237 In Liber Alphonsi episcopi Burgensis, no. 2, p. 162–186 ed. Birkenmajer. 
Cf. Hankins 2003, p. 200–211; Botley 2004, p. 53–58.
 238 The translation has to be examined an simplicitatem rerum et restrictam 
proprietatem verborum observet, ibid. p. 175 ed. Birkenmajer.
 239 Harth 1968, in particular p. 42–52.
 240 Harth 1968, p. 48.
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interpres as it was first developed for the translation of the Holy 
Scripture which demanded that the translator refrains from al­
lowing his understanding of the text to distort the truth of the 
work to be translated.241 In this tradition translation was strictly 
separated from expositio,242 which was a scholarly effort in its own 
right, pursued in commentaries. 
Bruni’s theory of translation and his translations make this 
separation of translation and explanation obsolete. For him a 
translation is no longer the attempt of reproducing faithfully, 
or slavishly, the Greek original in a different language with the 
result that the reader who tries to make sense of it to is often at 
a complete loss.243 Instead, translation is the self­confident act of 
an individual who undertakes the task of making the sense of the 
text comprehensible, without the enigmata of the old translation,244 
at times by small additions (s. above p. 53; 55), however, eliminat­
ing the need of additional glosses or a commentary.
The second aspect addressed by Alfonso concerned rheto­
ric. Infusing rhetoric that aspires to charme of persuasion opens 
the possibility for errors and creates confusion.245 This applies 
 241 Harth 1968, p. 51 f.; see above p. 24.
 242 Cf. Cincius Romanus in his report of Chrysoloras’ position, cited by 
Keßler 1995, p. XI n. 16; see above p. 19.
 243 J. Dunbabin, “The Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle’s Politics”, in 
CHLMPh (p. 723–737) p. 723 f. argues that William’s translation is “in 
general, … a very accurate rendering. Unfortunately accuracy is more 
than counterbalanced by unintelligibility.” Therefore, the earliest Latin 
commentators had “to engage in the task which Moerbeke had declined, 
to explain what Aristotle was saying, using the methods of exposition.” 
William translated Arist. Politics I 1, 1252a14–16 ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τοὺς λό­
γους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης κατὰ μέρος ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος, 
πολιτικόν as quando autem secundum sermones disciplinae talis secundum 
partem principans et subiectus, politicum (p. 2.6–8 ed. Susemihl). Here 
Rubinstein ([1987] 2004), p. 320 n. 20 comments: “This is a good ex­
ample of the difficulties Moerbeke’s translation was liable to present to 
commentators of the Politics.” See above p. 15 with notes 34–36. 
 244 Praemissio Politicorum p. 74 ed. Baron, translated by Griffiths, Hankins, 
Thompson 1987, II 7:VI, p. 163. Cf. Hankins 2003, p. 199; 203.
 245 Saepe enim elegantia sermonum, si non stricto iudicio dirigitur, simplicitatem 
rerum confundit, quod maxime rectum scientiae intellectum perturbat, Liber 
Alphonsi episcopi Burgensis, no 2, p. 175 ed. Birkenmajer.
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to Bruni’s translations who, as Alfonso claimed, went so far as 
to subordinate philosophy to rhetoric. For Alfonso, the rhetori­
cal style adopted by Bruni creates confusion whereas Bruni had 
maintained the opposite, namely that the earlier medieval trans­
lation were obscure, abstract and lacked the clarity of expression 
in an established language (s. above p. 29 f.). Bruni in his concept 
of translating does not only aim at reproducing the sense of the 
source in a clear way but at reproducing its literary qualities too. 
When Jerome claimed that he did not compromise with regard to 
sense, even if something with regard to words might be missing246 
Bruni might disagree with this principle slightly insofar as he 
would not allow that either the sense or the high stylistic quality 
be sacrificed.247 
Regarding Alfonso’s reference to rhetoric, we will soon turn 
to the question whether Bruni added stylistic elements of rheto­
ric to a text which lacked them. In De Interpretatione Bruni com­
pares the text he translates with a work of art,248 which turns the 
translator into an artist.249 As such he induces the reader to appre­
ciate the artistic qualities of the original. Bruni had argued, and 
documented on the basis of Aristotelian passages, that Aristotle’s 
style, like that of Plato, possessed remarkable literary qualities 
which have to be expressed by the translator. At least according 
to De Interpreratione 250 there is no longer the contrast found in 
 246 Ep. 57.6.2, cited above p. 30 n. 103.
 247 De Interpretatione [14] p. 86: Hec est enim optima interpretandi ratio … 
ut neque sensibus verba neque verbis ipsis nitor ornatusque deficiat, pre­
ceded by nec aliter servare sensum commode poterit nisi sese insinuet ac 
inflectat per illius comprehensiones at ambitus cum verborum proprietate 
orationisque effigie, i.e. the preservation of the sense includes not only 
proper rendering of words but conveying an ‘image of the speech.’ 
 248 [2] p. 74, cf. [13] p. 84, cf. Botley 2004, p. 53 f. 
 249 De Interpretatione [5] p. 76–78. 
 250 Hankins 2003, p. 184 f. argues that for Bruni the character of translating, 
that is the degree of precision, varies according to the genre of the work 
being translated. This might well be the practice he followed, but it is 
not suggested as an option in De Interpretatione. The notion developed 
by Decembrio, Filelfo and George of Trebizond that different techniques 
of translation should be applied according to the variety of subject mat­
ters (Hankins ibid.) adopts Jerome’s principles, s. above p. 23 f. 
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Cicero De optimo genere oratorum 5.14 of translating like either 
an interpres or an orator. For Bruni, the translator is interpres and 
expresses all the rhetorical qualities of the source.
Two questions arise here: Did Bruni “mistakenly” (s. be­
low p. 71 f. with n. 257) under Cicero’s influence see in Aristotle 
rhetorical qualities which the works he translated did not have? 
And: did Bruni produce a translation which improperly displayed 
a rhetorical style to the degree that it distracted from the “sim­
plicity of matters” as Alfonso had assumed? 
Jerrold E. Seigel has argued that Bruni’s approach to transla­
tion was influenced to some degree by that of Coluccio Salutati 
(1331–1406) who, although not knowing Greek, expressed to An­
tonio Loschi (1368–1441) dissatisfaction with an older translation 
of the Iliad and suggested improving on its literary qualities by 
adding decorations and splendor of language, in particular “con­
junctions, exclamations, and interrogations.”251 Salutati revised a 
Latin translation of Plutarch’s De ira by Simon Attumano by in­
serting into the plain text exclamations and questions.252
While Bruni would agree with Salutati’s criticism of the old­
er translation he did not follow the sort of improvement Salutati 
had in mind.253 I could not find in Bruni’s translation of Aris­
totle’s Politics passages which show rhetorical features like ex­
clamations or interrogations where the Greek text did not have 
them. In fact, Politics III chapter 10 is written in a very rhetorical 
style with exclamations and interrogations but Bruni did not add 
to these features but remained almost disappointingly restrained. 
As far as I could observe, he was not guilty of either wrong­
doing Alfonso associated with rhetoric,254 nor did he contract in 
 251 Seigel 1968, p. 117. Salutati’s letter: Epistolario, book VII, no. 23, vol. II, 
p. 354–358 ed. Novati.
 252 “For the sake of splendor or embellishment (ornatus) it is legitimate, as 
long as the sense is not altered, to add heat to the lukewarm quality of 
plain prose and to arouse through exclamations or the stimuli of ques­
tions,” ornatus enim gratia, manente sententia, licitum est continue narra­
tionis quendam teporem accendere et per exclamationes aut interrogationum 
stimulos excitare, Epistolario, book VIII, no. 23, vol. II, p. 483 ed. Novati.
 253 Seigel 1968, p. 116–119.
 254 S. above p. 46 n. 181.
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his translation in order to make a poignant and incisive remark, 
nor did he expand on the original for rhetorical reasons,255 he is 
definitely not more verbose. Already Baron observed that Bruni 
adhered to a style “that was closer to the precision and factual 
accuracy of the unrefined volgare than to all artificial sentence 
structures of Ciceronian eloquence.”256 
I have not seen evidence that would show that Bruni sacri­
ficed precision for the sake of elegance. However, is elegance in 
a translation of Aristotle’s treatises really incongruous with his 
style? Cicero’s and Quintilian’s characterizations of Aristotle’s 
writings are commonly referred to the so­called Hellenistic Aris­
totle, that is his exoteric writings, mostly his dialogues which 
were known to Cicero, but are lost now, whereas the existing 
Corpus Aristotelicum does not enjoy a high reputation for its 
stylistic refinement. Seigel argued that Cicero’s judgment which 
referred to Aristotle’s now lost works was “mistakenly” applied 
by Bruni to the treatises of the surviving Aristotelian Corpus 
 255 He did occasionally expand in order to explain a term: at III 14 
1285a28 f. where he contrasts the protection a king receives from his 
citizens with that of a tyrant provided by foreigners. Instead of trans­
lating ‘foreigners’ (ξενικόν) by a single word as William had done 
(extranei, p. 215.10 ed. Susemihl) Bruni chose ab extraneis mercede con­
ductis (f. 51r ed. Paris 1526), clarifying that they were mercenaries. The 
announcement at IV 8 1293b31 f. νῦν δὲ δεικτέον ἡμῖν περὶ πολιτείας 
is rendered: Nunc autem es a nobis de illa quae communi nomine appel­
latur respublica ostendendum, ed. Paris 1526 f. 64r—quae communi nomine 
appellatur is Bruni’s addition which clarifies the ambiguous term; it 
is missing in William p. 407.3 f. ed. Susemihl. Another addition, that 
of regem, is discussed above p. 53; for suadenti cf. p. 55. Exaggerated is 
the judgment of Susemihl 1872, p. XXX: “Tantum enim abest (scil. a 
lectione codicum) … Aretinum ‘verbum pro verbo reddere solere’, ut 
iuste saepius sensum multo magis quam litteram respexerit … nec sit 
ab omni vitiosae negligentiae crimine liberandus. Saepius utitur tanta 
circuitione et circumscriptione, ut genuinorum scriptoris verborum 
vix vestigia recognoscas.” Bruni stood in the tradition that privileged 
faithfulness to sense over that to words. 
 256 Baron 1928, p. XXIV f.: Bruni blieb “einer Schreibweise treu, die der 
Prägnanz und sachlichen Treffsicherheit des prunklosen Volgare näher 
stand als allen kunstvollen Satzbildungen ciceronianisch­literarischer 
Eloquenz.”
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with the result that this caused him to “distort some features” of 
the Aristotelian writings he was dealing with.257 According to this 
view the stylistic qualities Bruni praised in Aristotle’s work258 are 
not present in the works he translated. The influential Aristote­
lian scholar Werner Jaeger denied that the philosophical treatises 
are works of literature.259 Similarly Ingemar Düring characterized 
Aristotle’s philosophical treatises: “unliterarische Prosa”,260 prose 
without literary aspirations, and this is generally the judgment 
on Aristotle’s style. If this judgment were correct, then the char­
acter of Bruni’s and even more of Perion’s translations would fail 
to understand and reproduce the genre of philosophical writings 
by dressing them up in a rhetorical manner.
At the end of the 19th cent. Friedrich Blass discovered that 
Aristotle in the last two books of the Politics avoided hiatus, a 
stylistic practice which Plato began to adopt in his later dia­
logues.261 Clearly, Aristotle provided stylistic refinement here. In 
my opinion Aristotle, the author of the treatises of the Corpus, 
has been underrated as a writer who was aware of style, he has 
been underrated as a writer of literature. His awareness of stylis­
tic features is documented in Poetics ch. 22 and Rhetoric III. I will 
argue that an analysis of the style of the Politics shows that he 
consciously employed rhetorical devices262 and that the ideals of 
 257 Seigel 1968, 110. Seigel’s “mistakenly” is echoed by Keßler 1995, p. X 
n. 12 “sachlich falsch”. Botley 2004, p. 43–45 argues that Bruni became 
over time increasingly certain of the rhetorical qualities of Aristotle’s 
work, including his Physics and Metaphysics. Botley p. 49 shows that 
the rhetorical quality of Aristotelian works, here the Posterior Analytics, 
had already been maintained by Roberto Rossi in 1406, cf. ibid. p. 59 f. 
for Melanchthon and F. Burchard. 
 258 Cf. Botley 2004, p. 42–62.
 259 W. Jaeger, Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles, 
Berlin 1912, 133: “Die Lehrschriften sind überhaupt nicht Literatur.” 
cf. G.E.R Lloyd, Aristotelian Explorations, Cambridge 1996, 2: “these are 
not works prepared for publication as literature;” similarly Hankins 
2003, p. 198.
 260 Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens, Heidelberg 1966, 
p. 555. 
 261 F. Blass, Die Attische Beredsamkeit, Leipzig II 1, 21892, 140.
 262 I have discussed Aristotle’s style in: “Form und Stil aristotelischer 
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translation as employed by Bruni are not deplorable aberrations. 
I can here only refer to selected examples from Aristotle’s Poli­
tics and Bruni’s translation since a comprehensive comparison of 
Aristotle’s Politics with Bruni’s translation has not been done and 
would go beyond the scope of this essay.263 
At Politics III 16 1287 a 23–25 Aristotle writes: 
“issues which, as it seems, a law cannot determine a human 
being can hardly recognize” (ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι 
διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ’ ἄνθρωπος ἂν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν, alla mēn 
hosa ge mē dokei dynasthai diorizein ho nomos, oud᾿ anthrōpos an 
dynaito gnōrizein). The rhyme, paronomasia, διορίζειν/γνωρίζειν 
(diorizein/gnōrizein), intensified by the repetition of two differ­
ent forms of δύνασθαι (dynasthai/dynaito) preceding the infini­
tives diorizein/gnōrizein, reminds of the style of Gorgias, but it is 
less obtrusive because of the chiastic position of the infinitives 
and subjects διορίζειν ὁ νόμος / ἄνθρωπος γνωρίζειν (diorizein ho 
nomos / anthrōpos gnōrizein). At the same time, the two main verbs, 
different forms of δύνασθαι (dynasthai/dynaito, polyptoton), and 
the dependent infinitives are arranged in parallel order so that 
chiasmus and parallelism are combined. The 15 words are chosen 
and arranged in a remarkably skillful way, employing traditional 
rhetorical devices in a less impertinent and much more tasteful 
way than we find it in Gorgias or Isocrates. William’s transla­
tion at vero quecumque non videtur posse determinare lex, neque homo 
utique poterit nota facere (p. 228.8 ed. Susemihl) does not reproduce 
any of the stylistic features, and nota facere is mistaken,264 a verb 
like cognoscere was needed. Bruni translates: 
Pragmatien” (1989), now in Schütrumpf, E., 2009, 146–159, and in 
Aris toteles Politik Buch I, 1991, vol. 1, p. 65 with n. 2; Buch VII–VIII, 
2005, vol. IV, p. 86 f.
 263 The situation has not changed since Seigel’s remark about the Nicoma­
chean Ethics: “no modern scholar has undertaken this task (of collating 
the medieval version and that of Bruni with the Greek text) in full; it 
is to be hoped that someone will,” p. 131. He adds that the few partial 
attempts “have not yielded results favorable to Bruni.” 
 264 William was misled by the usual meaning of verbs with the ending 
­ιζειν. e.g. οἰκίζειν “make a house”, “settle”.
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quecumque vero videntur per legem quidem determinari non posse, 
neque per hominem agnosci potuisse (ed. Paris 1526 p. 55v). 
He employs only parallelism, and since he could not imi­
tate the paronomasia διορίζειν/γνωρίζειν (diorizein/gnōrizein) he 
chose that of posse/potuisse and saves somehow Aristotle’s stylis­
tic intentions.
At VII 12, 1331 b 19–22, at a juncture where Aristotle ends 
his discussion of the desirable conditions of the best state in 
order to move on to the treatment of the constitution itself he 
remarks: 
οὐ γὰρ χαλεπόν ἐστι τὰ τοιαῦτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι 
μᾶλλον· 
τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ συμβῆναι τύχης, 
that is: 
“for it is not difficult to think up such things, but rather 
to do them. 
Since in order to express them one needs only wish, but 
(for them) to happen (one needs) fortune.” 
Clearly ποιῆσαι (poiēsai) is meant to echo νοῆσαι (noēsai). How­
ever, Aristotle is not satisfied with employing this device (paro­
nomasia) once, he repeats it immediately by ending with τύχης 
(tychēs) which echoes preceding εὐχῆς (euchēs). As mentioned 
before, this statement is found at the end of a section. If one 
considers this passage remarkable one can find support for this 
view in Aristotle himself: at Rhetoric III 7 he deals with stylistic 
features which one can condone in an orator who speaks emo­
tionally. Aristotle cites φήμη δὲ καὶ γνώμη (phēmē de kai gnōmē, 
1408 b 11 ff.) which Isocrates is supposed to have used at the 
end of the Panegyricus—according to our manuscripts Isocrates 
wrote φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην (phēmēn de kai mnēmēn, 4.186). In any 
case Aristotle uses himself a rhetorical device which he says can 
be tolerated under certain circumstances, that is at the end of a 
speech, and he uses it in Politics VII 12 in the same situation, but 
goes even beyond Isocrates by using it twice. Let us turn to the 
Latin translations: William of Moerbeke translated: 
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non enim difficile est talia intellegere, sed facere magis: 
dicere quidem enim voti opus est, evenire autem fortunae,265
and Leonardo Bruni: 
cum sint illa difficilia cognitu, sunt magis factu.
Dicere enim voti est, evenire autem fortunae.
William’s version is clearly verbum e verbo, even the two Greek 
particles μὲν γὰρ (men gar) are rendered (quidem enim)—this does 
not seem to be proper Latin266—whereas Bruni used only one 
(enim) which makes the sentence run smoother. The infinitives 
intellegere and facere which William had used following the Greek 
source Bruni replaced by the grammatically more idiomatic su­
pine cognitu and factu which are emphasized by their position at 
the end of the respective clause.267 Bruni diverged from Aris totle 
only in so far as he changed the paratactic antithesis of the first 
sentence to a hypotactic structure. This has the effect that from 
the very beginning, the introductory conjunction cum (in conces­
sive sense) prepares the reader to expect that the idea expressed 
in the first part will be contrasted by some alternative thought, by 
a different idea. This was not the case in the Aristotelian text—
actually in the first words Aristotle quotes almost verbally Plato268 
who had not added the contrast of ‘doing’. And by choosing the 
hypotactic structure Bruni pronounces a judgment on which of 
the two parts of the paratactic antithesis of the original he con­
siders more important. These changes are very subtle, but nev­
ertheless show a translator who thought about the meaning of 
the text and about how to convey it best. It is important to stress 
this because when Bruni wrote: dicere enim voti est, evenire autem 
 265 P. 295.6 f. ed. Susemihl.
 266 TLL, vol. 5, part 2, col. 588–9 lists enim combined with iuncturae, con­
junctions and particles like atqui, but there is no example for quidem 
enim. 
 267 S.M. Leumann – J.B. Hofmann – A. Szantyr, Lateinische Syntax und Sti­
listik, Munich 1965, p. 382 f. 
 268 Legibus V 745b5 ἃ νοῆσαι τε καὶ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν χαλεπόν (ha noēsai te 
kai eipein ouden chalepon), cf. Schütrumpf, Aristoteles Politik VII/VIII, 
2005, p. 440 n. on VII 12, 1331b20.
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fortunae, one is led to assume that he had William’s translation, 
who had translated dicere quidem enim voti opus est, evenire autem 
fortunae, open on his desk.269 Bruni followed William’s transla­
tion closely, except that he omitted two words, quidem and opus 
which again make it run smoother by freeing the Latin of un­
necessary fillers. There was the view that Greek language lacked 
the conciseness of Latin,270 and Bruni wrote his translation as 
the Latin prose required it without incorporating idiosyncrasies 
of the Greek. This practice resulted in a leaner style whereas 
William had no consideration for the conventions of the Latin 
language. Bruni kept his independence from William and made 
changes that improved on the Latin grammar and succeeded in 
clarifying the logic of the argument and conveying the style of 
the original.271 
Much more could be said on this subject. In my opinion 
Aristotle wrote at least his Politics and Nicomachean Ethics in an 
elegant manner which employs at the proper places discretely 
and with the best of judgment a varied style and does not tire the 
reader with the mindless use of rhetorical devices as is found in 
Isocrates. Was Aristotle’s style too subtle for modern readers and 
even most scholars to appreciate its literary qualities? A notewor­
thy exception is Franz Dirlmeier who observed that according to 
 269 Cf. III 10 1281a20 οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν translates Wil­
liam neque iustum civitatis corruptivum (p. 190.3 ed. Susemihl), and 
Bruni (ed. Paris 1526, f. 46r) takes over everything word by word, but 
adds only the auxiliary verb est (corruptivus is not used by Cic., but 
Tertullian, Jerome, Boethius, s. TLL vol. IV, col. 1067). Seigel 1968, 
p. 119 states the same for the translation of the Nicomachean Ethics: 
“He seems to have had the version of his predecessor before him while 
working on the Ethics,” cf. the examples above p. 47 f. 
 270 E.g. expressed by Poggio Bracciolini in a letter to Francesco Accolti, 
effugi verbositatem qua Greci ut plurimum referti sunt, cited by Botley 
2004, p. 48.
 271 I would not agree with Botley 2004, p. 49, that “Bruni’s translation does 
have a tendency to make Aristotle neater and clearer than he is in 
Greek,” rather in Bruni’s translation Aristotle is neater and clearer 
than in the clumsy literal translation of William.
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the quality of style, Politics was intended for publication.272 One 
cannot but agree with Bruni’s argument that the stylistic quality 
of the source, its charm and splendor, need to be preserved in 
the translation.273 For Leonardo Bruni to use Cicero as his model 
for the style to be followed when translating Aristotle’s Politics is 
clearly adequate, and the criticism leveled against Bruni’s choice 
is based on a misunderstanding of the literary qualities of at least 
some of the works of Aristotle. 
The union of philosophy and rhetoric which Cicero es­
poused274 influenced Humanists275 and not the least L. Bruni. 
However, in his translations Bruni was not thinking of his role 
as an orator who could have a public influence, but of an artful 
translator who in his translation made Greek philosophy acces­
sible to those who could read Latin. He used rhetoric not so 
much to make the translations more attractive but because the 
authors of these philosophical works, Plato and Aristotle, had 
already effectively employed rhetorical features when writing in 
a refined and polished style. If we enjoy the elegance of the Latin 
of Leonardo Bruni’s translation of Aristotle, we might as well do 
this with a good conscience since he succeeded in reproducing 
the quality of Aristotle’s prose. 
 272 F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles. Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, vol. 7, Eudemische 
Ethik, 41984, p. 114: The Politics “war jedenfalls, wie die Stillage zeigt, 
für Publikation im modernen Sinne des Wortes gedacht.” Cf. my paper 
cited above p. 71 n. 262.
 273 De Interpretatione [12] p. 82: Cum enim in optimo quoque scriptore, et pre­
sertim in Platonis Aristotelisque libris, et doctrina rerum sit et scribendi 
ornatus, ille demum probatus erit interpres, qui utrumque servabit, cf. [14] 
p. 86, cited above p. 68 n. 247. 
 274 Cf. De oratore III 17.64; 35.142 ff.
 275 S. Seigel 1968.
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a p p e n d i x
Observations on the editions of Bruni’s translation of Aristotle Pol.
ed. Strasbourg 1469; Paris 1511; 1515; 1526; Iuntina Venice 1568
The Strasbourg edition of 1469, the “first printed edition of Aristotle” 
(Riley, s. above p. 59 n. 229), provides an inferior text, marred by in­
consistent spelling and by omissions. The Iuntina, Venice 1568, often 
agrees with the ed. of 1469. 
At Politics II 9 1270b7 in ed. 1469 f. 107v the translation of τὰ περὶ τὴν 
ἐφορείαν is que circa efforos constituta sint, whereas at b25 the spelling 
of the translation of ἐφορείαν is ephoria. A different inconsistency is 
found f. 102v (II 6 1265b39) quoniam efori ipsi ex plebe sumuntur. alii ef­
forarum (obviously wrongly for efforatum) quidem tyannidem putant (s. 
above p. 47 n. 186).
At III 13 1284a17, f. 122r the Strasbourg ed. 1469 has ostratismus, against 
ostracismus ed. Paris 1511 f. 46r; 1526 f. 50r; Iuntina 1568
IV 6 1292b33–36 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν εἶδος ἓν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταύτας 
τὰς αἰτίας· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην διαίρεσιν· ἔστι γὰρ 
καὶ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος, μετέχειν μέντοι 
<τοὺς> δυναμένους σχολάζειν is in ed. Strasbourg 1469 f. 131v hec 
igitur est una species popularis gubernationis. Altera vero species est omnibus 
licere qui prohibiti non sint per genus … (identical Iuntina 1568 f. 57v/58r). 
It omits διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας and διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην διαίρεσιν and 
contracts therefore the syntactical structure. The edition Paris 1511 f. 
57v hec igitur his de causis una est species popularis gubernationis. Altera 
vero species est ob adhibitam electionem. Nam omnibus licet republica 
participare qui prohibiti non sunt per genus … (identical ed. Paris 1515  
f. 50r; 1526 f. 62v) exhibits the omitted words and restores the syntax. 
Of these five printed editions, the ed. Paris 1515 is by far the worst:
at IV 8 1293b36 f. τὰς δὲ … εὐγένειαν = eas vero quae ad paucorum 
gubernationem vocare optimates, ex eo quia opulentioribus doctrina atque 
nobilitas is printed f. 51r twice 
II 7 1266b10 τέκνων: ed. Paris 1469 f. 103v filiorum (= ed. Paris 1511 f. 
23v; 1526 f. 25v; ed. 1568 f. 22v), ed. Paris 1515 f. 21 filiarum
1266b30 οὐκ ἔστι: ed. 1469 f. 103v fieri, = Paris 1511 f. 24r; 1526 f. 26r, 
ed. Paris 1515 f. 18v feri 
II 8 1268b34 ἐπιστημῶν ed. 1469 f. 106r with extreme contractions, 
ed. Paris 1511 f. 26v scientiis = ed. 1526 f. 28v; Iuntina 1569 f. 25r, ed. Paris 
1515 f. 23v sententiis 
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1269a4 πάτριον: ed. 1469 f. 106r patrium = Paris 1511 f. 26v; 1526 f. 28v; 
Iuntina 1568 f. 25r, ed. Paris 1515 f. 26v partium
II 9 1270b4 ἄφρουρον εἶναι: ed. 1469 f. 107v eum esse immunem a cus­
todia = ed. Paris 1526 f. 31r, ed. Paris 1515 f. 25r eum etsi immunem a 
custodia
1270b39 κυρίους εἶναι κρίσεων μεγάλων: ed. 1469 f. 108r magnis de 
rebus decernendi potestatem = Paris 1511 f. 25v; ed. Paris 1526 f. 31r; Iun­
tina 1568 f. 27v, ed. Paris 1511 f. 25v magnis de rebus discernendi potestatem
1271b15–17 ἀποβέβηκέ τε τοὐναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμφέροντος˙ 
τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς δ᾽ ἰδιώτας φιλοχρη­
μάτους: ed. 1469 108v evenit … publice inopiam privatim avaritiam in­
ducere (= Iuntina 1568 f. 28v). However, the other editions (Paris 1511 f. 
29r; 1515 f. 26r; 1526 f. 31v) print evenit … nam publice inopiam privatim 
avaritiam (ed. Paris 1515 f. 26r amicitiam) induxit. Here the version of 
1469 is syntactically less close to the Greek since it makes the main 
clause (τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον …) still depend­
ent on the preceding ἀποβέβηκέ. It shows a preference for hypotaxis 
over parataxis (s. above p. 74) which the later editions seem to have 
removed in order to follow closer the Greek. 
III 17 1288a28 πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ, ed. 1469 126v ut huic suadenti 
pareatur = ed. Paris 1511 f. 51v; 1526 f. 56r; Iuntina 1568 f. 51r, Paris 1515 
f. 45r ut huic suadendi pareatur
IV 11 1295b6 ὑπέρκαλον, ed. 1469 f. 134v si modum excedant … seu si 
forma … = Iuntina 1568 f. 61v, ed. Paris 1515 f. 43v si modum excedant … 
seu si fortuna …, so already ed. Paris 1511 f. 61r; 1526 f. 67v
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This study places the earliest translations of 
Aristotle’s Politics into the larger context of 
approaches to translating Greek philosophi-
cal texts into Latin since Cicero. The option 
of rendering verbum pro verbo, word by 
word, was adopted by William of Moerbeke 
(c. 1215–1286) but rejected by Leonardo Bruni 
(1369–1444) whose polished style has been, 
undeservedly, criticized for ignoring the 
quality of Aristotle’s prose. Nicole Oresme 
(c. 1323–1382) presented the first transla-
tion of Aristotle’s Politics into a vernacular, 
French. All translators have contributed to 
the modern political vocabulary.
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